

JPRS-SSA-84-126

6 December 1984

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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6 December 1984

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## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

### SALC DELEGATES IN MAPUTO TO DISCUSS MIGRANT LABOR

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Delegates from several Southern African countries have been meeting in Maputo since yesterday morning to discuss problems involving the migration of the work force in the region. This meeting, the sixth of its kind, must plan the Conference of Southern Africa Labor Ministers, scheduled for next Friday. Participating, in addition to Mozambicans, are delegations from Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Swaziland and Lesotho, as well as representatives from the ILO [International Labor Organization], ECA [UN Economic Commission for Africa], PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] and SACTU [South African Congress of Trade Unions], and also from the liberation movements SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] of Namibia, and ANC [African National Congress] of South Africa.

Zimbabwe's labor minister, Frederick Shava, officiated at the opening session. In his remarks, the Zimbabwe minister described the work accomplished to date by the Southern African Working Commission (SALC) as constructive, and expressed his wish for success in this battle to find solutions for the labor problems in this section of our continent.

In response, our country's state secretary of labor, Aguiar Mazula, said that there is among all the countries which are members of the SALC an awareness of the serious nature of the problems and difficulties that are interfering with the settlement of issues associated with migrant labor.

Aguiar Mazula commented: "The struggle against the present system for migrant labor going to South Africa is part of the more global struggle for regional economic development devised by SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference]. We consider it of interest to ascertain the connection that our organizations should have with the work force development programs on the part of SADCC, with a view toward guaranteeing the employment of migrant workers as a means of reducing labor's dependence on the mines."

Our country's state secretary of labor added that the available reports indicate that the health care, safety measures, insurance and living and working conditions in South Africa are very unstable. At a certain juncture, Mazula remarked:

"The mines are genuine death traps. The workers who return or who are repatriated have a maximum life expectancy of 5 years. They return mutilated or ill, and spread tuberculosis in epidemic proportions among the rural areas where the opportunities for medical treatment are limited."

In his speech, Aguiar Mazula noted that the situation has been worsened by the economic crisis which has beset the African countries in particular, as well as by the natural disasters that have struck our area and the action for political and social destabilization prompted from abroad.

He announced that, since independence, Mozambique has been expending efforts to eradicate these evils. The small projects in the rural sections, particularly in the agricultural and industrial areas, were cited as development enclaves based on a Mozambican experiment.

Aguiar Mazula proposed that the meeting study practical matters relating to the implementation of the Charter on Southern African Migrant Workers' Rights. Today, the meeting will continue with the reading of reports and debates, in accordance with the program.

2909

CSO: 3442/55

## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

### ADENAUER FOUNDATION ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA REPORTED

Bonn AFRIKA-POST in German Oct 84 pp 6-8

[Article by Thomas Kruchem: "South African Activities of Adenauer Foundation"]

[Text] Ulundi, capital of KwaZulu homeland, mid-1984: annual meeting of the politico-cultural liberation movement "Inkatha." Underneath a huge tent, 4,000 black-green-and-yellow bedecked delegates are discussing the issue of black political co-determination and the issue of the South African constitution which prevents it.

There are 30 well-dressed guests of honor; among them, a blond, lanky man of about 40. His name is Gerd Bossen and he represents the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in South Africa. As always, he is wearing a red T-shirt, blue jeans and a cowboy hat. Nonetheless, he has to stand up more often than all the others there to thank the speakers for their words of praise. It is obvious: the just 2 year-old partnership between "Inkatha" and the CDU party foundation is bearing its first fruits.

#### Why KAS and Inkatha Collaborate

It all started a good 3 years ago. At that time, the then KAS representative for southern Africa, Dr Josef Luedtke-Entrup, had gone to the Boer republic to look for a partner organization. To put it differently: Luedtke-Entrup was supposed to get a foot in the door of South Africa's political future on behalf of the CDU—because the fact is that KAS is a prime political tool of the CDU notwithstanding the fact that the "foundation" aspect sounds as though the organization were independent and purely altruistic. Like the foundations of the other German political parties, KAS, too, pursues long-range foreign policy goals (by development policy means, in most instances).

It was no accident that Luedtke-Entrup soon zeroed in on "Inkatha" as a partner. This liberation movement which has one million charter members (most of them Zulu) is the largest political organization in southern Africa. Its president, Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, who also holds the post of prime minister of the KwaZulu homeland, has turned Inkatha and his government into organizational pillars of the resistance. For decades, the



54 year-old Zulu chieftain has been carrying on a non-violent struggle against Pretoria-style independence; against social discrimination of Blacks and against their continued humiliation by means of passport laws and a lack of civil rights. The majority of the seven million Zulus—including those living in the economic backwater of the homeland and those living in the city (Soweto)—is solidly behind Buthelezi. According to the most recent polls, they have been joined by a growing number of adherents from other groups (above all the Sotho).

Luedtke-Entrup and his KAS chiefs quickly realized that "Inkatha"—with its base among the largest population group in southern Africa, its tight organization and its commitment to peaceful change—was the right partner. "It is a political factor," Gerd Bossen says today, "without which none of the groupings—neither the Whites, nor the ANC, nor anyone else—can hope to find a lasting solution for South Africa."

In March 1982, KAS head Bruno Heck and Buthelezi met in Bonn and agreed to "cooperate as closely as possible." By April, the foundation sent Gerd Bossen, a judge born in Angola, to Durban. His assignment was to intensify political cooperation with "Inkatha" and to work out some projects.

The four projects with which Bossen has since been concerned are carefully coordinated. They are to "give as many Blacks as possible an opportunity to create the conditions for peaceful change in southern Africa." One of the projects looks into the problems of Black school graduates entering professional life in a world dominated by Whites. Two of the projects are devoted to training leadership personalities (so-called multipliers) such as business consultants as well as experts in development and administration. And then there is an information and counseling center which Bossen is currently building up in Durban that is to deal with a wide range of problems confronting urban Blacks.

The total annual budget amounts to DM 500,000—which is another way of saying that southern Africa has become a "focal point of the foundation's activities in Africa" over the past 2 years. KAS has other representatives in southern Africa in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania and Swaziland. Cooperation with Mozambique is a possibility—insofar as political common sense may be expected to take root there once again.

Almost all the projects are handled by Bossen in close cooperation with "Inkatha." To operate them, he relies on experts within the country (two-thirds of whom are still Whites at this time) who are hired for limited periods of time and are paid by KAS. Later on, "those receiving support should continue on their own."

In many quarters of the African opposition both "Inkatha" and the Adenauer Foundation are targets of sharp criticism. They are operating within the homeland system (which is hated by most Blacks in its present form) which is considered a prime element of "big" apartheid. Organizations such as the "United Democratic Front" (UDF) call it "treason" against the cause of the Blacks. No wonder that polarization within the Black camp is also becoming more intense. More and more often, there are bloody clashes between members of the UDF and "Inkatha"—frequently at the slightest provocation. Bossen tries to mediate by speaking to both sides.

The KAS representative also keeps in touch with members of the White ruling National Party (NP). "I have to learn to understand them, too," he says. "Change in southern Africa can only take place with the help of the Whites and not in opposition to them."

But despite his willingness to understand a strict government rule applies to Bossen as much as to anyone else: foreign political organizations may not enjoy permanent residency in South Africa. The Adenauer Foundation representative is continuing to work on the basis of a limited exception to this rule which makes it almost impossible for him to draw up long-range plans. In the beginning, he had to leave the country every 3 months; his present residence permit expires on 31 December 1984. Gerd Bossen believes that the Pretoria government is afraid of setting a precedent which other foundations could then cite. "And they do not want any of them here under any circumstances," he says. In addition, "there are some people inside the bureaucracy who are close to Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party who would love to place obstacles in my path."

#### No Politically Explosive Projects

So as not to jeopardize his other work, Bossen chooses not to engage in politically explosive projects—such as in the labor union field, for example. Other German foundations (such as the Ebert and Naumann foundations) have tried such things and "have run into a stone wall."

When our conversation ultimately got around to the long-range results of his work, Bossen's comments were somewhat guarded. "The smallest part of the results come out in the projects themselves or at official occasions." Many conversations "with all sorts of partners" take place behind closed doors. As "a kind of representative of the biggest ruling party in Germany," Bossen also plays "a kind of foreign policy role" (without saying so out loud) outside the sensitive official channels. What the fruits of his labor are—based on a precise analytic mind, an amazing imagination and great personal commitment—only a handful of insiders will ever know—if they will.

9478

CSO: 3420/14

LACK OF SUCCESS AT OLYMPICS PROMPTS SPORTS STRATEGY RETHINK

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 12-26 Oct 84 pp 18-19

[Article by Hassan Toure: "Africa With No Doctrine or Strategy"]

[Text] The Association of Inspectors of Youth and Sports organized a dinner-discussion led by Amadou Lamine Ba, secretary-general of the CSSA and the UCSA on the topic: "Africa Facing the Olympic Movement: Its Place in the Renewal."

The meeting allowed the numerous sports figures who were invited to the discussions to analyze Africa's participation, but also to measure the immense potential of our athletes who, unfortunately, do not enjoy the same training conditions as those from the West and the East. African participation, Amadou Lamine Ba will say, "should be examined in terms of evaluation, of teaching, in order to learn, in the light of a courageous diagnosis, what lessons to draw from it."

Africa won 13 medals compared to 9 at the Moscow Olympics. However, one must not lose sight of the large number of African Olympic committees (40) which answered the call from the United States, compared to 21 in Moscow. The mathematical ratio shows a weakness of results, but the important thing is to hold the new attention for the Olympics which, from now on, appears as a code of ethics, a humanism.

It is therefore regrettable that politics colors the spirit of the games. After the Moscow games, observers were awaiting the Soviet retaliation which, moreover, was not a surprise. Ba will say in substance, "They were not the only ones to boycott the games. Africa, however, which is the first to have boycotted the Montreal games, had offered very valid arguments, that is, the rejection of apartheid in sports."

The games showed how much the Americans are always intending to further establish their capitalism (which the secretary-general of the CSSA will call a "Chinese puzzle".) Hence the creation of Olympic villages to make the games profitable, which, of course, "made the games lose their universalism due to the scattering of the athletes."

And what about the quality level of the performances? "Just fair," Ba will say. "There were Olympic records broken, but no world records." Los Angeles showed that the games now more than ever must remain a cultural and sports festival. Sports are an undisputed element of a rapprochement among peoples, which, still according to Amadou Lamine Ba, could make it possible now to decrease tensions between certain states.

Gigantism and sponsorship showed the Olympic Games' capability for self-financing, which in fact is only the reflection, if not a demonstration, of power by the Americans, whose patriotism was often synonymous with chauvinism. In fact, the television viewers could not help but appreciate the American athletes. One must also say, as Mr Ba emphasized, that technology facilitated the Western athletes' preparation. "High-level sports require a certain number of variables (notably specialists in medicine, psychology, etc....) The athlete has become a true laboratory product. On one battery of tests, athlete X will produce performance P at hour H, which is far removed from the unsophisticated training of our athletes, some of whom were able to take advantage of the Americans' ingenuity behind the scenes.

The African sports situation is more worrisome now than ever. We are always looking for a doctrine and strategy to develop sports in Africa. The absence of organization and method in sports programs and their implementation penalize our sportsmen by depriving them of competition. If it is true that the material conditions are not yet assembled, it is all the more true that the persistent practice of irrational preparation is blocking our athletes' psychological development. It comes back to the ONC's to play important roles in the development of African sports, but alas, "They form, make a show of allegiance, resurface several months after the games, then it is almost total lethargy." And yet Africa is the most powerful continent with its Olympic committee staff.

The discussions allowed all sides to satisfy their curiosity by arguing their point of view with enthusiasm. Such a discussion should be resumed and expanded to the point of bringing in the ONC that sent no representative to it.

9895

CSO: 3419/107

MOXICO OFFICIAL DISCUSSES LOCAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATION

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Oct 84 p 10

[Interview with Provincial People's Assembly Secretary Paulino Yambeno by Lollo Agostinho: "Moxico's Problems Must Not Divert Us From Priority Objectives"]

[Text] Since we are unable, for reasons entirely beyond our control, to conduct a live interview, we are publishing here the answers to a series of questions and topics which we had prepared and given to Provincial Commissioner Paulino Yambeno. Our interview subject is also the first secretary of the Provincial People's Assembly and is acting provincial commissioner since the commissioner himself, Maj Joao Lourenco went abroad and, prior to our return to the capital, gave us these topics so that all of our efforts to interview him directly came to naught.

Question: Comrade acting provincial commissioner, the first question which we would like to put to you is to outline for us the province's current political-military panorama.

Answer: The political-military situation of the Province of Moxico can be explained easily in the light of two outstanding issues whose beginning goes back to the second half of 1983 but which more properly dates back to the Lusaka Accords between the governments of Angola and South Africa.

First of all, the fact that the main offensive units of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] puppets in the country's south have been dismantled due to the decline in the effective support from the South African racists, caused a revival of operations in the northern part of the province of Kuando-Kubango. On the other hand, the process of Namibia's moving forward to independence caused imperialism to move its offensive units against the People's Republic of Angola through other areas. These combined two factors meant that enemy operations were stepped up in the Province of Moxico, something which did not come off due to the always prompt response from the country's defense and security forces.



As a result of the volume of enemy aggression, the townships of Bandas, Luchazes, and Alto-Zambeze continue to be hard-hit although the operations carried out by the puppets in these regions cost them dearly; here we must recall Kangamba and Luau where the enemy lost most of his troops and consequently his entire aggressive impetus; this will not enable them to resume any major offensive on short notice since they are still feeling the effect of the heavy losses they have suffered. In summary we can say that enemy operations were aimed at cutting off production, destabilizing the morale of the population particularly by concentrating on the inhabitants of the rural areas.

Question: Laying the foundations of the socialist economy by replacing the structures of modern capitalism is a directive that was issued by the party. On the basis of this approach and given the specific situation in this province, how did you handle the prospecting for and utilization of existing resources in the most varied localities, factories, small industries, etc.?

Answer: Government control over the territorial economy is making itself felt particularly in the area of small industrial units that operate as economic units under local subordination.

In the field of agriculture, we have already taken significant steps toward organizing activities along the lines of the principles of socialist production, through the establishment of cooperatives and associations of peasants and craftsmen, as well as the takeover and effective control of private and individual production units. The operation of these units is characterized by the same problems that beset the other sectors of the province's life, especially the electric power shortage, the lack of transportation for fertilizer, seeds, and farm machinery, and the insufficient concentration of raw materials.

#### Electric Power Shortage Limits Economic Growth

Question: We know that the war situation, as a factor that influences almost all activities in this part of the country, caused a shortage of food products, inefficiency in the distribution network, and finally an inability to meet the urgent needs of the moment. Is there any immediate action plan at the central or local level?

Answer: The province's social-economic development depends on the situation we experience at all levels, most of all as regards the lack of security that prevails in the most productive areas. On the other hand, technical equipment supply shortages do not enable us completely to carry out our economic-social development plans, nor can we carry out the goods circulation plans with acceptable indexes.

We must realize that the Province of Moxico depends almost completely for its supplies on the central agencies since highway transportation, the only possible form of transportation at this moment, due to the fact that the rail line is almost completely closed down, cannot meet the province's real needs.

On the other hand we get to feel the irregularity of energy supplies for the operation of small industries and for the mechanical support facilities for agriculture. We made sacrifices to meet the people's most basic food needs since the big Achilles heel is to be found precisely in transportation, a situation which many times does not enable us to bring food, fuel for machinery, spareparts, and even construction materials to areas far from the province's capital.

Another factor that upsets the balance is the departure of the population from the rural areas, moving to the urban areas; this means that there has been a decline in the farm products shipped to the consumer market whereas, on the other hand, there is a surplus population in urban areas with a subsequent rise in consumption requirements there.

1985 Investments Will Come to 626.2 Million Kwanzas

Question: Has the general government budget draft for 1985 in the province been discussed and approved? What local projects have been authorized for that year?

Answer: Questions having to do with financial management in the province are linked to the approval, by the Provincial People's Assembly, during its tenth special session, of the documents drafted by the provincial government agencies, especially the provincial budget for 1985 and the plan for that year. These documents cover all activities connected with the development of the territorial economy and the corresponding financing for the government agencies and local establishments on the basis of the guidelines issued in view of the need for pursuing a policy of financial austerity.

Projects concerning financial development recommend money investments amounting to 626.2 million kwanzas and cover various fields, particularly as regards economic and social development.

To manage the economy, we are planning next year to establish agencies capable of exercising central control over production and social activities under local subordination, in the capacity of direct investor; on the other hand, we are looking toward the development of these production facilities with the help of production equipment and the supply of the necessary technical equipment, aimed at the development of small-scale industry, the establishment of agricultural seed improvement and reproduction stations, the dissemination of technical processes, material assistance for the organized peasants and individual growers, the restoration of the equipment inventory, etc.

We must also devote our attention to the institution or revival of activities in the areas of sanitation, hygiene, and the beautification of population settlements, the creation of social development conditions in rural areas, as well as the maintenance and repair of school buildings and city health stations.

## Mobilization For Defense Tasks

Question: What happened or what was decided regarding the organization of all workers in the ODP [People's Defense Organization] and the Popular Vigilante Brigades?

Answer: Last year we had a general mobilization to organize all workers in the ODP; this led to the establishment of units that are currently engaged in political and combat training for the fightingmen. At that time, about 3,000 workers were sworn in. After that we organized these workers in the defense detachments and in the Popular Vigilante Brigades. We are now organizing a new phase of combat training to bring the workers and other persons in the ranks of the ODP and the Popular Vigilante Brigades up to date.

Question: What progress can we record in the area of literacy training in recent years?

Answer: Literacy training was carried out in a positive way up to the 10th stage but, as for questions tied more directly to the lack of literacy instructors as well as the rather low level of interest displayed by literacy trainees, this activity declined a little bit with the exception of some townships. Literacy training drives are now being continued in the enterprises and organizations.

5058

CSO: 3442/60

OFFICIAL DENIES NORTH KOREANS TO REPLACE CUBAN TROOPS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 5 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] An official Angolan source, contacted on Thursday [4 October] by ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency] scored as "unfounded and slanderous" the information conveyed by "a certain tendentious and sensationalist newspaper" concerning the possible replacement of the Cuban internationalists in Angola by North Korean troops.

The same source added that these stories, which were first circulated by the South African press and were later echoed in the United States and other western countries, "were intended to weaken the efforts toward peace which have been made in the region by the People's Republic of Angola and to create confusion in international public opinion."

"This smokescreen is also intended to provide an alibi for South Africa's continuing support of UNITA, which goes against the spirit and the letter of the Lusaka agreements, signed in Angola and in South Africa," the source continued.

The source added that this kind of story fits well in the campaign by international imperialism to undercut the People's Republic of Angola and to negate its diplomatic efforts, which are directed toward establishing a lasting peace in southern Africa.

"There is no logic whatever in the replacement of the Cubans by North Koreans," said the source which ANGOP contacted, noting that the Angolan and Cuban governments have always expressed their readiness to study a schedule of gradual removal of Cubans from Angola, provided there are absolute guarantees of the end of South African aggression against Angola and the end of all support of UNITA by Pretoria, and provided that Namibia achieves real independence.

2641 .

CSO: 3442/27

## COMMENTARY COMMEMORATES INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY

MB110609 Luanda ANGOP in French 1350 GMT 9 Nov 84

[ANGOP commentary: "After 9 Years"]

[Text] Luanda, 9 November (ANGOP)--The People's Republic of Angola, in its unstoppable march which overcomes all obstacles tirelessly, advances slowly but surely toward social progress in an effort to improve the living conditions of the Angolan people.

The sons of this battered country, born during the struggle against foreign intervention, are repelling their enemies in order to hoist the flag of peace. Their first objective is the establishment of a society in which words such as humiliation and exploitation of man by man have no practical meaning.

The independence of Neto's fatherland, won on 11 November 1975, is the noblest of the hopes of the Angolan people. This was the consecration of the people's centuries old resistance against foreign colonial domination, characterized by a violent suppression of our cultural identity and of the Angolan people, who have now chosen their own path to follow.

The Angolan people did not hesitate on the means to achieve liberation, and they launched an armed struggle to crush the arrogance of colonial domination. Workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals as well as the whole Angolan people understood that the only way to achieve independence was to close ranks around the MPLA and march, weapons in hand, to overthrow the enemy. This struggle lasted 14 long years, and thousands of men who died in it are now the pride of this nation.

As soon as national independence was achieved, the main economic sectors--the banks, mineral resources, trade, and industry--were nationalized. Health and education are now free of charge.

The struggle for national reconstruction in which the Angolan people are engaged has achieved remarkable successes in the socioeconomic area, which is proof of their determination to overcome the vestiges of underdevelopment.

For a country like Angola, which inherited an economy from colonialism which was based on the exploitation of the natural resources without taking into



account the balanced development of the country, it was necessary to concentrate the country's efforts on accomplishing the plans already outlined.

The path that this young nation intended to follow did not please many others, and a war of aggression was waged from the Machiavelian centers of imperialism.

For this purpose, they concentrated on economic targets vital for the balanced development of the country. Hydroelectric power stations, bridges, and electric power lines were among the favorite targets of those who were trying their utmost to prevent Angola's progress.

The counterrevolutionaries, with the support of South Africa, also launched all kinds of terrorist actions against the defenseless population. Wherever they go, the stateless bandits leave a trail of death and destruction. Women, old people, and children are barbarically murdered and their belongings stolen.

This explains why the nation's leading political force, the MPLA-Labor Party, decided to transform this year's national plan into an emergency plan so that we can adapt the national economy to the war situation in which we now live.

The national commissions created for this purpose work to minimize the main problems of the population. An increase in production, the production of essential goods such as food, and the reorganization of the industrial sector are the main areas to be revitalized by the present emergency plan because these areas, in one way or another, affect greatly the every-day life of the people.

While celebrating the ninth anniversary of the proclamation of national independence, the same courage that characterized decent Angolans in their quest for freedom must predominate more than ever to show the world our unwavering will to construct a socialist fatherland in this part of Africa.

The barriers which the enemy is placing in our path will be overcome. If necessary, we will shed more blood because as the leader of the Angolan revolution, the late immortal President Agostinho Neto, said, we will make Angola the fatherland of the workers and the revolution, and will continue our victorious march together with the nations who follow the same path.

CSO: 3419/133

CPSU, SUPREME SOVIET SEND ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE

MB160909 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 16 Nov 84

[Message from the CPSU Central Committee and the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos commemorating the ninth anniversary of Angolan independence--date not given]

[Text] We express our cordial congratulations to you, Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee, the People's Assembly Standing Commission, the government, and all Angolan friends in the People's Republic of Angola on the occasion of your national day, the ninth anniversary of the proclamation of the independence of the People's Republic of Angola.

During all these years of development since independence, the Angolan people, while encountering many difficulties, have advanced on the path of freedom and progress under the MPLA-Labor Party, their political vanguard party, and are implementing deep social and economic transformations through socialism. International imperialism, South African racists, and their lackeys representing the internal counterrevolution never give up their attempts to deprive Angola of its revolutionary gains in order to impose the former order on it. The courageous struggle of the Angolan people against the collusion of the external and internal reactionaries, the defense of independence and territorial integrity of their fatherland, and the unwavering political line of the MPLA-Labor Party are consolidating to reaffirm universal peace and frustrate imperialism's militaristic and neocolonialist designs, thus earning Angola great respect from the democratic and progress forces the world over.

We express our certainty that the friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Angola, strengthened by our Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, will continue to be ever increasingly promoted in the interest of the peoples of the two countries, international peace and security, and the cause of national and social liberation of the peoples.

We wish the entire Angolan people the leadership of the MPLA-Labor Party and you personally, Comrade President, successes in the building of a new Angola through the path that you have chosen for your development.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

CASTRO MESSAGE ON INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY

MB121139 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 10 Nov 84

[Message from Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and president of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba, to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos on the occasion of the commemoration of the ninth anniversary of Angolan independence--date not given]

[Text] On the ninth anniversary of the People's Republic of Angola, we express to you, to the Angolan people, to the MPLA-Labor Party, and to the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, the fraternal greetings of the Cuban people, the Cuban Communist Party and the government of the Republic of Cuba. We hail the efforts of the Angolan people in their struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, and racism and for national unity and reconstruction.

On the ninth anniversary of the proclamation of independence, we underline with satisfaction that the revolutionary struggle started by the cherished leader Agostinho Neto to attain an independent and dignified Angola has been continued in an unwavering manner by the MPLA-Labor Party.

Imperialism and the South African racist regime have increased pressures and maneuvers and attempt to delay the processes of change in southern Africa. The Angolan people and MPLA-Labor Party firmly maintain their national independence and their solidarity with Namibia and other African countries.

Comrade president, accept the support and the militant solidarity of the Cuban people, party, and government, who are sure that in that common struggle, the ideas of the proletarian internationalism, will win.

CSO: 3442/69

DOS SANTOS MESSAGE TO USSR ON ANNIVERSARY

MB100834 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 9 Nov 84

[Congratulatory message from Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos to Konstantin Chernenko, CPSU general secretary, on the occasion of the 67th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution--date not given]

[Text] Esteemed comrade, on the occasion of the 67th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, I want to convey to you my warmest congratulations in the name of the Angolan people, the MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee, and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

Sixty-seven years have passed since that historic date when workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionaries, and intellectuals overthrew the bourgeois power and constituted the first socialist state in Russia. Since then, the number of countries and political forces who adhere to the principles of the Marxism-Leninism has not stopped growing.

By implementing these principles in accordance with the conditions of the USSR, your party was able to transform your country into one of the greatest world powers and to demonstrate the vitality of the theory of the proletariat.

We join with the manifest joy of the USSR people, who are now commemorating important victories obtained against imperialism and their agents and their achievements in economic, social, scientific, and technical fields.

We wish the Soviet peoples and the CPSU Central Committee best wishes for progress and prosperity, and we reiterate our desire to continue developing the ties of friendship, solidarity, and cooperation existing between our peoples, parties, and states. Please accept my highest regards. [Signed] Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Chairman of the MPLA-Labor Party and president of the People's Republic of Angola.

CSO: 3442/69

## BRIEFS

**COMBAT PREPARATIONS IN UIGE, HUAMBO**--Uige--The ceremony of beginning a new year of operational, combat, and political preparation for 1984-85 took place Monday [2 October] in the municipality of Negage, at the Commander Bula National Aviation School, and were presided over by the Provincial Commissar Zeferino Estavao Juliana. At the ceremony the fighters of the Fifth Independent Artillery Brigade, stationed in the city of Negage, demonstrated to the officers, noncoms, and enlisted men and party and government officials of the province various types of arms for combat and political preparation in the First Political Military Region. As he was closing the ceremony the Provincial Commissar of Uige praised the courage and the vigor demonstrated by the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] fighters in improving combat readiness. On the same day, the new year of combat and political preparation for 1984-85 was celebrated in Huambo at the headquarters of the Fourth Political Military Region. The ceremony was presided over by Major Armando da Cruz Neto, commander of the Fourth Political Military Region (Huambo and Bie). During the ceremony messages were read aloud from OMA [Organization of Angolan Women] and from the Cuban internationalists, demonstrating the importance of combat and political preparation within the Armed Forces. This is important in view of the total annihilation of the puppet bands and also because of the efforts exerted toward consolidation of the victories already achieved. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 3 Oct 84 p 3] 2641

**FNLA CLAIMS**--Four military campaigns on Angolan territory carried out by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) have resulted in 44 dead among the government forces and the capture of various war materials. In a communique which reached our offices yesterday the FNLA claimed that near Mica, on the road leading from Nanbuangongo to Mabubas, a FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] column was intercepted on its return from an operation against Holden Roberto's movement; the result was 13 casualties among the Communist forces. Along the highway line which connects Lucala and Banga the FNLA ambushed a patrol which had killed five soldiers of the Communist government of Luanda, as shown by their membership cards in the MPLA. In another ambush along the Mandimba-M'Banza-Congo road Holden Roberto's forces caused nine deaths among Communist troops from Luanda who were traveling in a Land Rover. In yet another ambush the FNLA destroyed a convoy along the Musealuando-Cambamba highway; this resulted in the death of 17 Cuban and Angolan soldiers, 5 of which were Cuban and 12 FAPLA personnel. [Text] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 10 Oct 84 p 5] 2641



LISBON SHOWING OF UNITA FILM--For many long months the timidity of the Portuguese government and the demands of MPLA have given UNITA an amount of propaganda which no one could have dreamed of. Now that these months are over we have finally seen on television the program which has caused so much ink to flow. The teasing publicity which UNITA received from the beginning of the ridiculous process which led to prohibition of the program--a program which was, by the way, aired under the aegis of the Social Communications Council--surely had the effect of bringing to the television screen a much greater number of viewers than would have seen the program under normal circumstances. These viewers were able to learn at least three important facts: 1. UNITA is far from being a group of "armed bandits" and "mercenaries of international capitalism" fighting "against the Angolan people" in the forests of Angola, as an immense propaganda effort had tried to make them out. 2. Savimbi's speech was far from being a primitive document, but was instead a straight talk without ideological baggage, appealing to values much more positive, such as liberty and dialogue, than those who depicted a simple takeover of power by force of arms. 3. The claimed devotion of UNITA to the West is only circumstantial; there is no guarantee that, if Savimbi reaches Luanda, he will have any more consideration for western interests than the MPLA does. [Text] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 3 Oct 84 p 6] 2641

MEETING WITH WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION--A delegation of the CPSU has been visiting the country. This morning the Soviet party delegation held a meeting with the executive secretary of the Organization of Angolan Women [OMA]. During the meeting the two sides exchanged views about the work carried out by OMA and the main tasks of the Soviet woman. The Soviet delegation is led by Gennaldiy Andreyev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. [Text] [Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 7 Nov 84 MB]

ZAIRE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING RELATIONS: The Republic of Zaire is interested in developing its cooperation ties with the People's Republic of Angola in the fields of education, teaching, and scientific research. In an audience granted to (Ilungua Yaoka) Zairian ambassador to Angola, by Augusto Lopes Teixeira, Angolan minister of education, the Zairian diplomat manifested this wish of the Government of Zaire. During the meeting, other issues of bilateral interest were discussed. [Text] [Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1200 GMT 11 Nov 84 MB]

TRADE MEETINGS--The Angolan-GDR Joint Foreign Trade Subcommittee has been meeting in Luanda since this afternoon. In the meeting, the fifth since the establishment of the joint subcommission, the two sides will examine various issues connected with cooperation between the two countries. The Angolan delegation is led by Ismael Gaspar Martins, the minister of foreign trade and chairman of the Angolan-GDR joint subcommission, while the GDR delegation is led by Horst Solle, the minister of foreign trade of that socialist country. In their speeches, the two officials expressed the desire to see the relations of cooperation between the People's Republic of Angola and the GDR strengthened further. [Text] [Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 14 Nov 84 MB]

COOPERATION DISCUSSED--Luanda, 8 November (ANGOP)--Delegations of Angola and the GDR met recently in Luanda and analyzed the cooperation between the two countries and defined new areas and means to implement this cooperation. The talks were led on the Angolan side by Lopo do Nascimento, minister of planning and chairman of the Joint Intergovernment Commission, and on the German side by Dieter Albrecht, deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission and deputy chairman of the Joint Intergovernment Commission. [Text] [Luanda ANGOP in French 1600 8 Nov 84 MB]

EXHIBIT OPENS--An artistic exhibition composed of artesian and other articles intended for the infant activity, from the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaydzhan was yesterday inaugurated by Tel'man Orudzhev, a Central Committee member of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party and minister of the fruit and vegetable industry. The inauguration of the exhibition is the symbol of the socialist solution for the Angolan people who follow the socialism [word indistinct], said the representative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Socialist Republic of Azerbaydzhan. Tel'man Orudzhev expressed his congratulations to the party, government, and Angolan people for the commemoration of the ninth anniversary of their independence. The USSR delegation, which is in Angola (?to attend) the ninth anniversary of the Angola's independence, visited yesterday the headquarters of the Angolan League of Friendship and Solidarity with Other Peoples. There a Soviet artistic band of the USSR delegation played. [Text] [Luanda ANGOP in English 1630 GMT 8 Nov 84 MB]

CSO: 3400/203

COMMENT ON U.S. 'CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT'

MB090746 Maseru Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 8 Nov 84

[Station commentary: "United States Elections and World Peace"]

[Text] It is not customary for Lesotho to comment on the elections of other countries. This is a tradition that Lesotho had adhered to for decades as a matter of diplomatic habit and style. It is a habit and style deeply ingrained in this kingdom's policies of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. Elections in any country are a sensitive domestic issue, an issue that touches the very core of a people's sovereign right.

This does not mean that Basotho are not interested in the electoral process of other nations. This nation does not and never has pursued isolationist tendencies. This kingdom has historically recognized and accepted that it is part of a much larger world and that it is a member of the international community. Since independence, Lesotho has perceived its place in the world through the vista of interdependence. In this context, elections in other countries are not subjects of academic interest to Basotho, but events of practical relevance to assessments of Lesotho's National interest.

This kingdom is acutely aware of international interest in its own electoral process. A great many governments in the past have shown that interest and have not resisted the temptation of actually setting Lesotho's elections on the agenda of diplomatic relations with Lesotho. That, as has been the case, has much really often caused misunderstandings but is, nevertheless, understandable.

This kingdom is of interest to other nations because of its past, its present, and its potential for southern Africa, and the nation accepts that it has an historic mission in the region which invites international interest in its domestic affairs. All that Basotho ask and demand is that interest in its internal affairs should never overlap into intervention in the determination of its destiny.

Within this framework of perceptions of interdependence among nations, the recent American elections and their outcome are of more than indirect interest to the people of this kingdom. The United States is, after all, a superpower, whose attitudes and policies have a direct and profound impact on the lives,

not only for Americans, but of the entire world. A political earthquake in Washington will send tremors to Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.

Yesterday his majesty and the prime minister sent messages of congratulations to President Reagan on his electoral victory. The American people made their choice on the path of the United States for the next 4 years. That choice is based on the evaluation of many issues, including the role of the United States in the world affairs.

It is in this latter respect, primarily, that the reelection of President Ronald Reagan is of more than passing interest to the people of this nation. In his first 4-year term, President Reagan not only strengthened relations between Lesotho and the United States of America, but he initiated direct involvement of Washington in searches for peaceful solutions of the problems of Southern Africa through his policy of constructive engagement. That policy has as its principle objective dialogue with Pretoria on the problems of South Africa, Namibia, and other countries of Southern Africa.

Arguably, bilateral relations between the United States and most of the countries of the region have undergone some changes through that policy of U.S. constructive engagement. But there can be no question about the fact that the problems of Southern Africa are even more serious today despite that policy.

Tensions in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa still persist. Namibia, notwithstanding the euphoria and optimism aroused by the policy of constructive engagement, is still not free. The policy in itself represents a welcome American interest in a region that is increasingly becoming volatile and has all the elements of disruption of peace and stability and potential for an explosion.

If, as seems likely, President Reagan continues that policy, a dimension of urgency should be added to it--urgency to forestall a conflagration. That sense of urgency requires as its substance genuine constructive engagement with all the parties affected by the tensions in Southern Africa, and sincere dialogue with the real people who will determine the destiny of Southern Africa.

It is our sincere hope that President Reagan will interpret his landslide mandate from the American people to show and convince all the peoples of Southern Africa that constructive engagement is not a policy of political expediency, but of genuine and constructive American concern about social justice and the conditions of the human (?world) in Southern Africa.

CSO: 3400/202

SOVIET EMBASSY HOLDS RECEPTION ON ANNIVERSARY

MB101205 Maseru Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 10 Nov 84

[Text] The Soviet Embassy in Lesotho held a reception on the occasion of the 67th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Maseru yesterday.

Speaking on this occasion, the Soviet ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho, His Excellency Mr Yuriy Sepelev, said from the first days, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated in international relations the principles of peaceful coexistence, of equally beneficial cooperation among nations with different social systems, and has been carrying out the policy of peace initiated by the great Lenin, founder of the communist party and the Soviet state. Presently, the Soviet Union, together with the world's progressive forces, has been and will continue the struggle for safeguarding peace, curbing the arms race, and preventing nuclear war.

Mr Sepelev said the new important proposals introduced at the 39th session of the UN General Assembly are the examples of responsible approach, good will, and readiness for constructive talks on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

During the past year, the Soviet Union and Lesotho have come to know each other better and started to develop their bilateral relations and cooperation in various practical fields. He said the relations are based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. He said the Soviet Union shall continue to hold high these principles in its relations with Lesotho.

Mr Sepelev concluded by wishing his Majesty King Moshoeshoe II good health to further development of friendly Soviet-Lesotho relations and he also wished the Basotho people peace, happiness, and prosperity.

CSO: 3400/202



## BRIEFS

**SAUDI'S DONATE DRUGS--**Mali's call on the international community for assistance in the fight against cholera has been heard favorably in Riyadh. In fact, Saudi Arabia has just donated an important consignment of 47 tons to our country. The drugs were brought to Bamako by two Saudi Airlines planes that arrived on Sunday and yesterday, Monday. The drugs include vaccines, serums, glucose, syrups and other medicines against cholera. [Excerpt] [Bamako Domestic Service in French 1500 GMT 13 Nov 84 AB]

**MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT AID--**Malaysia has donated agricultural equipment to Mali yesterday. The donation is worth 100 million CFA francs and includes trucks, pumps and spare parts. [Excerpt] [Bamako Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 11 Nov 84 AB]

CSO: 3419/132

## RIGHT WING DAILY ANALYZES MOTIVES IN PRETORIA TALKS

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 23 Oct 84 p 21

[Text] The current status of the work being done by the Tripartite Commission stemming from the Pretoria Declaration and aimed at bringing peace to Mozambique has been attested to by the statements made on the same day on RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System] by FRELIMO's foreign affairs minister, Joaquim Chissano, and by RENAMO's [Mozambique National Resistance] secretary general, Evo Fernandes. From them the public was informed that the Maputo government still considers the rebels to be "armed bandits," with whom it will not negotiate on political terms, and that, insofar as the resistance is concerned, it is not reneging on its anti-Marxist goals nor on its right to participate in the talks on a completely equal footing with the government's delegation.

The public can clearly understand the situation, without failing to consider the fact that the two opposing positions challenge the contents of the communique distributed meanwhile in the South African capital, announcing the continuation of the talks. According to the chairman of the Tripartite Commission, Louis Nell, vice minister of foreign affairs of South Africa, "the situation is extremely delicate, but the bridges have not been burned."

With regard to negotiations, last week was, in fact, a "blank week." On the other hand, it was filled with rumors, dubious interpretations, gross insinuations and ridiculous guesses (anything that could help to heighten the confusion), to the point where it was claimed that Evo Fernandes went to Lisbon to meet with Mota Pinto and that Chissano met with Jaime Gama, also because of the Pretoria Declaration, whereas it is certain, and known from Samora Machel's most authorized spokesman, Comrade Muradali Mamadussen, that Portugal did not play and is not playing any role in these South African negotiations.

Also confusing is the communique from the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Mozambique convoked by Samora Machel in an attempt to reach agreement on several views dividing the leaders of the FRELIMO regime. After 2 days of meetings, during which all the members of the party's "Political Bureau" and the provincial governors participated, Samora Machel and his ministers produced a text which does not disclose anything and in which enigmatic desires for the implementation of a cease-fire are mingled with

references to victories won over the rebels, but concerning which there has been no news beyond the Mozambican borders.

The direction which has been taken by FRELIMO to solve the civil war problem appears to be based on the following two consecutive points: first, inasmuch as the rebels have the support of South Africa and, with South Africa's hostility, it is impossible for Mozambique to survive, let's carry out the Nkomati Accord, reverse positions, shelve the battle against the "apartheid" regime, pretend to abandon ANC and we shall be free from the rebels; second, inasmuch as the Nkomati Accord proved to be completely ineffective, let's demand that South Africa impose peace upon Mozambique but, with the Pretoria Declaration, impose it only upon the rebels.

It is a direction based on deceit and, to some extent, stupidity. The Nkomati Accord did not force South Africa to fight the Mozambican rebels, but only not to give them shelter or assistance; and this at a time when the resistance was already strongly entrenched all over Mozambique. The Pretoria Declaration, in turn, and despite the incoherence that typifies it, only forces South Africa to arbitrate negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO, aimed at a platform for agreement. Contrary interpretations are merely deceptions, but deceptions that could bring results if the participants in the talks deceive themselves or pretend to deceive themselves regarding the exact nature of the FRELIMO regime and the reasons promoting a national uprising that has spread, as a genuine "liberation movement," with backing not only from former Rhodesia or from various sectors in the Republic of South Africa.

#### A Criminal Regime

However, democrats and peace-loving persons in many different locations continue to overlook one fundamental factor for judging the situation in Mozambique: they still ignore the fact that, along with the hunger, the general poverty and the civil war, there is hovering over Mozambique a worse evil than those: subjugation to a criminal regime.

We are not the ones who described it as criminal. Nor does it concern us that it has, of course, been the resistance that has been suspected of bias. The one who made the charge of being criminal against the present Mozambican regime, scoring it for some of the countless human rights violations committed by it, was Amnesty International, pure and simple, in a document dated July 1973, whereby it was reported that, as of April of that year, over 70 individuals had been condemned to death for political crimes: condemned without a right to defense and executed under degrading, barbarous conditions. How can this disclosure be forgotten?

We heard echoes of that same charge in the pastoral exhortation from the bishops of Mozambique in May of this year, in a text which did not confine itself to condemning the crimes "of whatever origin," because it had the courage to cite "the unjust situations" created by the FRELIMO regime and the "inhuman, degrading measures" adopted by that regime's authorities, specifically, the banishment

of thousands of people to the so-called "reeducation camps," and the whippings inflicted on the prisoners accused of economic crimes.

Hence, let us overlook the disappearance of all the political leaders who were struggling for independence in 1974 but who were opposed to the dictatorship of the FRELIMO Party. Let us also ignore, among other extremely serious charges brought by the resistance, those of poisoning wells and resorting to chemical warfare or assassination of foreign cooperants, blaming it on the rebels' cruelty. Let us even disregard the slaughter during September and October in the then Lourenco Marques, where common graves received hundreds upon hundreds of horribly mutilated corpses. Let us ignore all this and not concern ourselves at all with the fact that Mozambique is ideologically dependent on Moscow. But regardless of how far we try to take the wave of forbearance, we shall be forced to stop when faced with the disclosures made by Amnesty International and the Mozambican Bishops' Conference.

Seven months elapsed between the signing of the Nkomati Accord and the reading of the Pretoria Declaration. It was sufficient time for President Samora Machel (without failing to declare himself loyal to Marxism-Leninism as, moreover, he has not failed to do on several occasions, perhaps now without any great sincerity) to have abolished the death penalty for political crimes, put an end to the law on whiplashing, restored the recollection of those executed without a trial and ordered the concentration camps closed, or at least ordered the termination of the violent acts committed in them. Instead of this, Machel thought that it would suffice to lay the blame on the authorities' zealousness, recommending less presumptuousness, pardoning about 50 accused persons, promising the rebels who surrendered "social rehabilitation" and daring to make three ministers ousted from the government the scapegoats, but keeping two of them, Armando Guebuza and Mariano Matsinhe, the latter of whom has meanwhile already rejoined the dictator's ministerial team, in the "Political Bureau." The FRELIMO regime is still a criminal regime.

#### RENAMO Has Reasons for Not Yielding

No one refuted Pieter Willem Botha, current president of the Republic of South Africa, when, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, he stated that "different political and socioeconomic systems should never preclude peace and cooperation among neighboring states." In the case of Mozambique, it is not just a "different" system that is involved, but also a system which includes in the differences undeniable violations of the Declaration on Human Rights; which could still be accepted in Pretoria, just as in Maputo there was an official cessation of the charge of identical violations by the South African state. What could not be demanded is that RENAMO must tread that slippery descent of ideological compromise. In theory, a good neighbor relationship between Mozambique and South Africa is possible and necessary for both, but neither in theory nor practice, much less, is RENAMO's military demobilization acceptable without the demobilization of the FRELIMO totalitarian regime.

This intransigent position of RENAMO is obviously very displeasing both to the South African negotiators and to the interests of powerful trusts on the Oppenheimer or Lonhro level, but it could not be otherwise in the case of the

movement headed by Afonso Dhlakama, which started precisely by challenging Samora Machel to hold free elections and which, throughout the period of secret contacts that preceded the Pretoria Declaration (in other words, between May and October of this year), has on constant occasions made us aware of the impossibility of any reneging on an issue regarded as essential: "the establishment of democracy in Mozambique." Nor is it necessary to emphasize the matter, pointing out that if RENAMO reneged on its political objective in Pretoria, it would be betraying the resistance fighters killed in the battle against the FRELIMO totalitarian regime. From a practical standpoint, this type of consideration is almost always the one carrying the least weight. What does carry weight, in this instance, is the certainty that any reneging on RENAMO's part would be merely a collective suicide.

Whether the resistance is headed toward that suicide from the pressure exerted in Pretoria and from the lack of external support that it has suffered, or whether, on the contrary, the firmness of its position's and FRELIMO's growing insecurity are capable of prompting Samora Machel to politically decapitate Marcelino dos Santos and the party's entire radical wing, are two predictions that cannot be made for the present. But those who are counting on the former may perhaps receive another disappointment.

2909

CSO: 3442/50



# VIGILANCE GROUPS' SECRETARIES DISCUSS ORGANIZATION'S GROWTH

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 11 Oct 84 pp 8-9

[Text] Nhaconjo: the Example in Beira, SOGERE Chiefs Surprised by GV's

Throughout the entire country, the growth of the Vigilance Groups (GV's) has been gaged not only from the number of their activities to neutralize and denounce the enemy's maneuvers, but also by the intensification of the bond between the people and the GV's, which is being reflected in a constantly increasing mutual cooperation. On the one hand, this has endowed facilities to the vigilance group members in the discharge of their honorable, difficult task; and, on the other, it is a harbinger that the day when all our people, whether accredited or not, will belong to the GV's is not far away.

Today marks the ninth anniversary of the creation of the SNASP (National People's Security Service). It is a commemorative date celebrated all over the country, also proclaimed as People's Vigilance Day, in connection with which various cultural, sports and recreational activities associated with festive times have been scheduled, with conviviality and brotherhood among people who are members of the same family, commonly known as GV's (Vigilance Groups).

Just as is happening in other sections of the country, in Sofala Province, and particularly in the city of Beira, the program relating to the celebration started nearly a week ago, including among other activities sessions to explain the origin and the political importance and significance of the GV's. This work is being directed by brigades consisting of members of that organization, whose fundamental task consists of combating and preventing crimes against the security of the people and the people's state.

An especially prominent feature called for during this commemorative mobilization is the official establishment of new GV secretariats among certain districts and enterprises; an action included in an extensive program to revitalize the rank and file organs with a view toward making them more operative and gearing them to the specific needs of the present phase of the Mozambican revolution.

DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE, for the purpose of making a brief assessment of the GV's growth, although it is far removed from what is desired, held a roundtable discussion in which secretaries from the GV's in enterprises and districts who have shown the most evidence in performing the difficult, critical

mission of vigilance against the enemy's manifestations took part. As the subjects of our interview noted, the expression "people's vigilance" is, understandably, simple and easy to say; but, actually, doing what it entails in a more profound sense is a complicated task, requiring patience, perseverance and a lofty patriotic spirit.

The vigilante, wherever he may be, works night and day. Unassuming, he tries to consolidate his involvement with the masses from whom he receives reports on any suspicious moves. He is not aggressive, nor does he carry an "AKM" on his back, but he is active and strict in exposing and neutralizing the enemy's maneuvers; and this is why "we are sometimes greatly hated and feared by those unfamiliar with our task and by our enemies."

Nine years since the creation of the Vigilance Groups, there is current evidence of an indisputable politico-ideological growth among those who have joined their ranks. Concurrently, there has also been a heightening of the masses' cooperation in vigilance activity; reflected in the supplying of information that makes it possible and easier to discover and dismantle dangerous networks of enemy agents.

#### Nhaconjo: Exemplary District

Luis Charles Chandima, the GV's secretary in the district of Nhaconjo, says that the success that they have accrued is a result of a whole effort coordinated with other local organizations, including the populace. However, he himself admits that, previously, when the coordination did not exist, it was virtually impossible to plan and execute any action that would bring success.

Nhaconjo, with seven communal units, 26 city blocks and a secretariat for the GV's comprised of five members, is an exemplary district for vigilance work. The GV's structural organization extends from the district to the unit and the city block, including the residents' commission.

Chandima comments: "We assign concrete tasks to each unit, city block and commission associated with 10 homes; we check the implementation and render periodic accounts. We look into every unusual movement over a 24-hour period, and hence we have achieved constructive work."

Chandima relates that, one day in August, someone who had been a previous resident of the district, and had been considered missing because he was gone for nearly 7 months, not informing any organization, showed up before them. He was introduced to the one responsible for the 10 homes, and asked to be given a statement to enable him to legalize his documents. His social conduct was suspected, and so he was taken to the district headquarters, where an executive council official, after analyzing the circumstances under which he claimed to have lost his documents, decided to send him to the GV's secretariat.

Luis Chandima disclosed: "We held him and questioned him, and he admitted to having been at an enemy base where he received military training, after which he was given the mission to hold up shops, burn vehicles and abduct and assassinate individuals. We concluded that he had come to our district to engage

in reconnaissance. We immediately sent the bandit to the authorized organizations.

"Since the beginning of this year, we have already detected three enemy agents, including a proven armed bandit. We have also discovered militia members who fled from Nhamatanda with the respective weaponry, and when they arrived in the district they remained at home. Some went out only at night, to cause disturbances."

The action taken by the vigilantes in Nhaconjo has assumed praiseworthy proportions. The speculators who proliferate in the city of Beira are afraid to "pry" into Nhaconjo, because the GV's there have become an impassable barrier against which all the attempted maneuvers are debilitated.

The assistant secretary of the GV's in that residential area, Manuel Alberto, told us: "We recently intercepted a speculator who diverted 43 cartons of cigarettes which he was attempting to take to Sofala (Buzi). When the vehicle which he had leased arrived at his house at nearly 3000 hours in the early morning, to carry the product, our member of the GV's was already there. He asked what the cartons contained, and was told that they held cornmeal. The vigilante, because he was suspicious, took the alleged dealer to headquarters, where an invoice was demanded of him, which he did not submit because, he claimed, it was still at the dock. We went to the dock and, since the invoice did not show up, we took apart the cartons and found hundreds of packs of cigarettes. The speculator was taken to the PIC [Criminal Investigation Police]."

#### SOGERE: Chiefs Surprised

Made official in 1979, the GV's secretariat in SOGERE is another example, because it has carried out plans crowned with success. At first, like others, it confronted obvious differences with respect to the other organizations, especially the administrative one, stemming from the misconception of the vigilantes' role.

When this difficulty had been surmounted, the secretariat became a dynamic, operative instrument, distributing its members throughout each of the sections and sectors in the enterprise.

"Our principal task is not to combat thefts, but rather any evil that could harm the enterprise's economy; and, of course, theft is also included in the category of what should attract our attention." With this comment, Jacinto Disse, secretary of the GV's in that enterprise, attempted to explain the fact that the organization which he heads has given priority to combating thefts of beer, in accordance with the local situation. He added:

"Many workers are in the habit of concealing bottles of beer in their pants or shirts, or elsewhere on their person, so as to be able to take it out through the gate. When the vigilante discovers this maneuver, he does not take direct action, to avoid bad relations with his colleague; but he notifies the guard at the gate, who acts when the person leaves for home.

"Because there were many rumors about the diversion of cases of beer at night, we met and decided to start a night-time operation known only to the party cell. For a tactical reason, we could not inform the other organizations. We also coordinated it with the district GD [Mobilizing Group] and, on the day planned, we worked intensively. During the operation, we seized many cases of beer, and the perpetrators were in some cases ordinary workers, and in others section chiefs."

He said: "Based on this experience, the enterprise organizations decided that the militia members should work over a 24 hour period, patrolling the inside and outside of the factory."

Jacinto Disse also disclosed to us that, in 1982, there had been a case of premeditated sabotage. It was the following, he explained: "A mechanic left the machine plant, as usual, and one of the machines began making sounds, until it became seized-up; but he knew that they needed constant care and attention. Therefore, we considered his leaving to have been deliberate."

#### DPEC-Close Vigilance

The secretariat of the Provincial Education and Culture Directorate (DPEC), created in June 1981, for its part, decided to organize the vigilantes in groups consistent with the services that existed in this sector of the state apparatus.

Gonga Sauculane, secretary of the GV's in the CAP (Instructional Backup Commission), a state agency, reported: "We neutralized an instructor/clerk who was working in the CAP section. He requisitioned 10 reams of paper and sold part of it to the FO-7 project and the other to Metalotecnica, for 3 million MT apiece. Fortunately, the maneuver did not go unnoticed by the vigilance personnel, and hence he was reported and turned over to the PIC."

In the realm of physical protection, the secretariat of the GV's in the DPEC has taken action aimed at fencing in the main gates and, at the same time, has reintensified the vigilance in all services.

Rafael Mapulas, of Renab, suggested, in turn, that a study be made of the possibility of assigning GV secretaries, full time, in the districts, so that they might actually ensure the effective discharge of their duties.

That suggestion was backed by the GV secretaries in the districts of Pioneiros and Esturro, who devised another alternative: requesting period leave for heads of the units' GV's to work on a rotating basis in the district headquarters, being replaced every 2 weeks.

#### Driving Vigilante

Finally, Adelaide Maria, assistant secretary of the GV's in unit H, of city block 1 in the Palmeiras district, described her experience as a driving vigilante and a vendor of small items:



Adelaide Maria emphasized that the fact that she was a driver and vendor has made it possible for her to perform her tasks better, because "people know that I am a vendor, and they often show up with products to sell me at high prices, forcing me to resell them at even more speculative prices. So, when this happens, I take immediate action. In the shop in Chipengara, where I work, I had been elected secretary of the GD; but because of my strict watch over the scales and prices applied by the salespeople, they eventually 'downgraded' me."

She remarked in conclusion: "As a driver, I do my work everywhere I stop. I have taken action against many speculators. They keep their eyes on me, because the people don't want them to be reported."

#### Maintaining Vigilance Is Mainly Mobilizing

Jorge Guilaze, provincial head of the Vigilance Groups in Sofala, commented: "Maintaining vigilance is mainly mobilizing the workers so that they will be fit to produce more and better, and preventing sabotage."

Speaking to the reporter from DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE a few moments after our round-table discussion, Guilaze told us that, at the present time, a widespread process is under way to revitalize the GV's rank and file organizations. He added that the recent official establishment of the secretariat in the district of Mungassa was associated with this effort.

Started in June of this year, the process of reactivating the GV's is meeting with considerable participation by the population, according to the individual with whom we conversed. Guilaze confirmed: "There are many volunteers who are applying."

The very same work is being done in the districts of Dondo, Buzi and Nhamatanda, and it is anticipated that it will be extended to the other districts by the end of this coming December.

#### Over 24,900 Vigilantes Signed Up

At the present time, Sofala Province has over 24,900 vigilantes distributed among scores of enterprises, state departments, schools, hospitals, localities, villages and communal districts.

That contingent, which could be termed a "people's vigilance army," has been variably distributed among secretariats of the GV's on the district, locality, village, neighborhood, communal unit and enterprise levels or in other work sectors.

In keeping with the growth attained and the requirements of this phase, the process of revitalizing the GV's that is under way in this region will also make it possible to expand these organizations to the city blocks.

2909

CSO: 3442/50



ARMED FORCES ENGAGED IN FOOD PRODUCTION, REBUILDING

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 29 Oct 84 p 10

[Report on interview with Fernando Mocambique, political commissioner of the FPLM battalion stationed in Mabote, Inhambane Province, by NOTICIAS, date and place not supplied]

[Text] A Mozambican army battalion stationed in the area of Mabote, Inhambane Province, has built a community of 50 improved houses and started a 12-hectare farm, on which they are growing drought-resistant crops. The soldiers are also taking part in the rebuilding of economic and social infrastructures destroyed by the armed bandits and are opening access roads for the shipment of the produce. In close cooperation with the people, the troops have been successful in their primary task of fighting the bandits--and can now devote some of their time to economic reconstruction.

The Mozambican armed forces stationed in Mabote, Inhambane Province, are currently engaged in the dual task of fighting hunger. As our reporter learned from the political commissioner of the battalion stationed there, a 12-hectare farm has already been established with priority given to corn, cassava and other drought-resistant crops.

Regarding the action which this military unit is conducting pursuant to the decisions of the Fourth FRELIMO Party Congress, particularly with regard to combating hunger, Fernando Mocambique, political commissioner of the battalion, said: "In addition to starting this 12-hectare farm, priority has also been given to establishing vegetable gardens in the lower regions, with satisfactory results in the last harvest."

Mocambique added that there had been a problem with the shortage of cassava tubers, but the local people had provided some from their own farms. Although there had been no rain in that region of Inhambane Province, harshly affected by the drought, Mocambique said the prospects for agricultural production were encouraging.

## Time To Rebuild

As a corollary to the successes in the total elimination of the armed bandits in the locality of Mabote, the battalion political commissioner told us that the time had come to rebuild everything that had been destroyed by the enemy.

In fact, the FPLM has built a settlement with more than 50 improved houses in the Mabote area, and other infrastructures are currently taking shape under the hands of the soldiers.

"At the moment, we are concentrating on the reorganization of life at the local level. We are participating actively in the rebuilding of schools, hospitals, cooperatives and other infrastructures which had been destroyed by the armed bandits," our informant explained. He noted that the FPLM is also taking part in reconstructing another two communal settlements in the district seat, where over 500 families are living.

Another FPLM action in Mabote has been the reopening of access roads which were also the target of bandit operations. At this time, travel is already possible as far as such interior zones as Tanguane, Zimane and Papatane. These areas had been completely isolated until the beginning of this year and the residents had completely abandoned their villages. "But today," Mocambique assured us, "people and cars are circulating freely, without need of a military escort, as was previously the case."

The Mabote Battalion political commissioner declared: "We are also working to reopen the sawmills. For example, the Chitanga mill, which had been idle since the middle of last year, has already resumed production. First, we drove out all the armed bandits; we are giving all the workers military training and now they are in a position to protect the entire area," Mocambique said.

He added that this training had been extended to the entire population throughout the area. "This is why it is possible today to rebuild everything that the bandits had destroyed."

## Priority to Patriotic Education

Asked about how the FPLM battalion in Mabote is participating in the patriotic education of the community and the students, our informant explained that the battalion's Political Commission already had a plan in effect to conduct periodic courses in neighborhoods, schools, work places and social centers.

"We are already seeing practical results from this educational activity: it is the way in which the community, the young people, the workers and students are determined to eliminate the bandits. If we can say today that the bandits have no encampments in the area, it is because of this determination, which is also the fruit of the patriotic education which we have carried out," explained Fernando Mocambique.

PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER VISITS 'HIDROMOC' PLANT

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 29 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] "Business is not just a matter of selling a product. Business also means providing technical assistance to the buyer." This is how Julio Carrilho, minister of housing and public works, congratulated the administration and the workers of the State Hydraulic Enterprise [HIDROMOC] on the opening of a special workshop for the assembly of electric pumps and the general repair of all types of motors, and also of five different makes of diesel engines.

Minister Julio Carrilho offered these words of appreciation on Friday afternoon during his visit to HIDROMOC's new maintenance shop, which will soon begin to repair hydraulic equipment for the city of Maputo and for Maputo and Gaza provinces. In the near future, this shop should serve the entire southern region of the country, according to the company management.

Julio Carrilo spoke of the company's need to focus attention on providing services in two important areas: the repair of waterworks equipment and of agricultural equipment. He said that, in the future, the company should make its clients aware that the solution to problems in the hydraulic sector does not lie in the acquisition of new pumps, as many argue, but in the maintenance of those we have.

The minister observed that the maintenance of equipment is a serious problem in this country. He said that HIDROMOC could earn a high reputation for its activity, "because business is not just a matter of selling a product; it also means providing proper technical assistance to the buyer."

The minister of housing and public works made a lengthy tour of the new plant facilities, accompanied by Andre Mapanzena, general director of HIDROMOC, and by Danish technicians who are installing the equipment and are now training Mozambican personnel for certain key sectors.

Water Pumps

During the construction minister's visit, the general director of HIDROMOC revealed that the company had just shipped manual water captation pumps to eight provinces.

These hand pumps, considered more up-to-date than those existing in several provinces, were acquired in the Netherlands for the specific purpose of providing rural communities with a means to tap water resources.

According to one of the company managers, 251 manual pumps have already been distributed: 36 to Niassa, 16 to Zambezia, 32 to Tete, 32 to Manica, 16 to Sofala, 43 to Inhambane, 60 to Gaza and 16 to Maputo Province.

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CSO: 3442/59

MOSSURIZE RESUMES NORMAL ECONOMIC PRODUCTION

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Oct 84 p 8

[Report on interview with Jose dos Santos Macaruge, administrator of Mossurize District, by NOTICIAS, in Manica Province, date not supplied]

[Text] "About 70 percent of the population of Mossurize District, Manica Province, has already received training and has been issued firearms and traditional weapons, and is tenaciously defending itself against the armed bandits," the administrator of that region recently reported. As a result of this action, economic life has already resumed in wide areas of the district.

Jose dos Santos Macaruge is first district secretary of the FRELIMO Party and district administrator of Mossurize. In a conversation with our correspondent in Manica, Macaruge observed that most of the communal villages and settlements in that area already have trained self-defense commands and militias.

The Mossurize administrator added that, at this time, the armed bands are becoming smaller and smaller because of the intensive action of the local population and of our armed forces. Popular involvement in defense grew after the peasants in the district were mobilized to engage in the total eradication of the bandits, using every type of weapons--including the traditional ones--in the war against the armed bands.

Santos Macaruge said: "Because of these actions, the armed bandits in our district are now traveling in small groups to avoid detection. We have liberated many peasants who had been forced to live with the bandits and we are also reclaiming many production zones, which we are immediately turning over to the peasants, so they can farm them and thus combat the famine."

Tangible Results

The official noted the appearance of [three] communal villages--the "Acordo de Nkomati," the "Fourth Congress" and the "Operation Production"--as a tangible result of the operations of our armed forces and of the people, trained and untrained, to eradicate armed banditry. Many of the peasants living in these communal villages were liberated from the armed bandits and others returned to the country after they learned that security in their district was returning to normal. These peasants had taken refuge in the neighboring Republic of Zimbabwe because of the destabilizing actions of the armed bandits.



At the time of our conversation with the Mossurize district administrator, about 2,500 people had returned to the district and were already integrated in communal villages and agricultural cooperatives or on their family farms. The returnees have been supplied with farm implements, foodstuffs and clothing.

Regarding the agricultural production of the repatriates and peasants liberated from the bandits, the district administrator said they were no longer dependent on any food from our government because they had enough food from their garden plots and the agricultural cooperative.

To achieve this, they had resorted to drought-resistant crops, primarily corn, cassava and sweet potatoes, and had made full use of the lower zones, growing vegetables in the lowland areas.

#### With Peace, Production

The peasants in the "Acordo de Nkomati" communal village in Mossurize District have already planted 26 hectares in grains in their agricultural cooperative, having diverted a river some 3 kilometers to irrigate their farm plots.

The peasants of the communal village of Chiurairue, also in Mossurize, have planted a vast area in corn, after opening an irrigation ditch to supply water to their fields.

The Mossurize district administrator also told us about the reopening of the road from Espungabera, the district seat, to Chiurairue, which had been cut off by the armed bandits some time earlier. The bandits had established their camp in the middle of that road to prevent the circulation of people and vehicles.

Santos Maparuge said that, in addition to this reopened road, the general clean-up of the armed bandits had also made it possible to rebuild many primary schools and a [health] post which had been destroyed; these infrastructures are now fully functioning.

Even with these first results, the peasants of Mossurize are maintaining their vigilance and, with each victory, this vigilance is redoubled. Their dream is one day to live finally in peace and tranquillity so they can work harder at eliminating hunger and poverty.

Jose dos Santos Macaruge said that the work of mobilizing and recruiting the inhabitants of the district is continuing, to see that all the adults join the self-defense forces against the armed bands and that the young people are made aware of their duty to report for compulsory military service.

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CSO: 3442/59

COFFEE CULTIVATION IN MANICA DESCRIBED

Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 17 Oct 84 p 16

[Text] At least 90,000 kilograms of coffee will be coming from the plantations that the Vumba Organizations opened this year in Manica, with the sowing of 15,000 seedlings during the first phase, and another 45,000 in the next phase. From the standpoint of internal consumption, the results will have an effect within the next 3 years and, according to the forecasts, the entire production will meet the needs of Manica and Sofala Provinces, where the shortage crisis has reached its height.

The coffee produced in Manica, at the initiative of the Mozambican farmer, Almeida Valgode, is of the Arabian type, similar to that in certain sections of Inhambane Province.

The coffee plantation is situated in the low-lying areas of the Manica District headquarters, over an expanse of 20 hectares; in addition to another one with 7 hectares extending around the Vumba mountain range, adjoining the water source, nearly 1,050 meters high.

In the starting phase that is currently visible, plans call for the growing of 60,000 coffee plants, from which it is expected to harvest 90,000 kilograms of coffee, if not 120,000; with a view toward attaining the desired agricultural yield: 2 kilograms per plant.

The grower, Almeida Valgode, already has 500,000 coffee seedlings, gathered during the course of the work done during the years preceding this campaign.

Almeida Valgode told DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE: "My goal is to prove to people that, with the few resources that we have, we can do something useful to society. And, in this instance, we want to satisfy coffee-lovers."

The farmer assured DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE that the town of Manica's potential for tropical crops "is quite favorable," since, as he claims, "the secret lies in knowing how to work with imagination."

On this occasion, Valgode, quoted a few verses from the Portuguese poet, Antonio Aleixo, "One who works kills hunger; he eats no one's bread; one who does not earn the bread that he eats always eats someone's bread" (sic).

### Setting New Shoots for Vines

At the initiative of the Vumba Organizations, there is included, in addition to the coffee production, that of other crops, as in the case of the wine-growing project.

For example, the workers from Vumba are engaged in setting new shoots for nearly 9,000 vines (over an area of 3 hectares), obviously aiming for the opening of another vineyard.

At the present time, the Vumba Organizations have started producing "Lion's Tears" brandy, grape wine and grapefruit wine, by way of experiment; something which has minimally compensated for the lack of alcoholic beverages in the region.

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CSO: 3442/55

DISTRICT LEADERS NAMED IN NIASA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Oct 84 p 8

[Text] On 12 October the leader of Niassa Province, Maj Gen Mariano Matsinha, announced that Francisco Cuinica, the present chairman of the City of Unango Executive Council, has become administrator of Lucheringo District, which was recently created in the province.

Mariano Matsinha, who spoke before several hundred persons gathered for a people's rally in Mbemba, added that the headquarters of Lucheringo District is the city of Unango.

Lucheringo District was created at the most recent session of the FRELIMO Party's Provincial Committee, by way of an experiment, in a process that will lead to the gradual creation of six new districts in Niassa Province.

Also created with Lucheringo, similarly by way of experiment, were the districts of Muembe, a former locality of Mavago District, and Macui, formerly Nipepe, which up until now had been operating as a locality of Maua District.

Meanwhile, on 13 October, a delegation from the party and state in the province, commissioned by Maj Gen Mariano Matsinha, presided over the ceremony in Mavago for turning over the authority from the old to the new district administrator.

A similar ceremony was repeated the next day in Muembe, with the same delegation officiating, headed by the Central Committee member and secretary of the Provincial Committee for the Organization of the FRELIMO Party in Niassa, Alexandre Franco N'Kalamba.

Designated to head Mavago District was Floriano Humberto N'Sipo, who had, heretofore, discharged the duties of administrator for the locality of Muembe; while the former administrator of Mavago, Miguel Felix Pinto, was named to head the new Muembe District.

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CSO: 3442/55

UNANGO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE EXCEEDS PRODUCTION GOAL

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Oct 84 p 8

[Text] The Agricultural Enterprise of Unango, in Niassa Province, surpassed the 1983 production plan for corn by more than 700 tons, harvesting 4.2 tons per hectare, as against the 3.5 tons estimated in the plan. For the next harvest campaign, the company hopes to obtain greater yields. Contributing to this effort will be four farm tractors to be used in seeding, recently delivered by GDR technicians who are working there. Moreover, the Unango Agricultural Enterprise plans to produce 750 hectares of seed corn and 200 hectares of soybean seed in the next campaign.

The enterprise, which has 1,350 hectares under cultivation, produced 1,000 hectares of corn, 150 hectares of butter beans, 50 hectares of wheat, 20 hectares of soybeans, 25 hectares of vegetables and 3.5 hectares of peanuts (an experimental crop). It also began production of sweet potatoes and bananas.

Wolfgang Smardz, assistant director of the company and chief of a team of GDR technicians who are working on the project, told NOTICIAS that from 15 November to 15 December, they will begin planting 840 hectares of corn and 200 hectares of soybeans.

The company plans to produce corn and soybean seed to supply the cooperative and family sectors: 750 hectares of seed corn and 200 hectares of soybeans. It hopes to produce 75 [tons] of regional strains of corn seed and 50 tons of bean seeds. The various types of corn seed could be sufficient to plant 7,500 hectares.

According to Smardz, two dams have been built in the last 3 years: one to hold 50,000 cubic meters of water and the other to hold 250,000 cubic meters. One of these dams is used to irrigate the vegetable fields.

In July, the Unango Agricultural Enterprise inaugurated a commercial establishment in Lichinga, the capital of Niassa Province, to market the vegetables which it produces, such as cabbage, tomatoes, onions, carrots, peppers and melons. To date, it has sold nearly 1 million meticals' worth of produce. It has also shipped large quantities of lumber to the province capital, transported in 150 8-ton trucks, along with 50 tons of coal.

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CSO: 3442/59



SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS COVERAGE OF BANDIT ACTIVITIES NOTED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Oct 84 p 1

[Article by Alves Gomes]

[Text] South African press coverage of terrorist activity by the armed bandits in Mozambique has increased in recent weeks, in contrast to the period before the Nkomati Accord.

The case of Jorge Cotane, who is hospitalized in Maputo as a result of wounds inflicted by the armed bandits, was covered prominently in the PRETORIA NEWS, under the headline "Rebels Kill for Pleasure." In statements reprinted in that newspaper, Cotane told about the murder of his little boy Afzai.

On 9 October, the same South African newspaper published a lengthy article based on a report in the U.S. newspaper WASHINGTON POST, in which it was revealed that before the signing of the Nkomati Accord, "South African military operatives had supplied enough weapons to the armed bandits to keep them in operation for more than a year."

The article revealed (1) that South African began to support the bandits under the administration of Prime Minister Botha "after his predecessor, John Vorster, had refused to become involved"; and (2) that the bandits are continuing to "receive support from Portuguese businessmen in South Africa and Lisbon."

These revelations, made in Harare by one of the founders of the armed bands, indicate that at the time of Zimbabwe's independence the bandits had three options: to bury their weapons and return to their homes; to leave Mozambique by way of Rhodesia and go into other countries, or to work for the South Africans who were eager to take over the operation.

The article in question ended by saying that Mozambique had "rigorously observed its own part of the Nkomati Accord," but that "the group supported by South Africa was continuing to operate without any apparent impediment."

On 9 October, the newspaper CITIZEN also featured an article on Mozambican-American relations, declaring that the United States had assisted Mozambique with food for the drought victims, which "can be considered a humanitarian gesture and not political," but that more recently the U.S. administration had

decided to initiate a cooperation program, "normally reserved for countries considered political friends."

This tone of the South African press, which certainly contrasts with the image put forward prior to Nkomati, has begun to appear more frequently since the Pretoria Declaration, in which South Africa pledged to put an end to the fighting and destabilization in Mozambique.

In this respect, and regarding the discussions which were held in Pretoria by the commission created in the Declaration of 3 October and chaired by Louis Nel, vice minister of foreign affairs, an article by Brian Pottinger in the SUNDAY TIMES said these were "important steps in the normalization of conditions in Mozambique, which is now threatened by armed rebels originally supported by South Africa."

The journalist made it clear in his article of 7 October that most of the responsibility for ending the conflict in this country rests with South Africa. The journalist added: "Although Mozambique has never accused Pretoria of breaking the Nkomati Accord, it has suggested that certain 'agencies' may still be operating from South Africa."

The respected RAND DAILY MAIL has also been playing up the conversations in Pretoria, informing its readers of the huge political movement among the Mozambicans in repudiation of the actions of the armed bandits.

Jose Caetano, a reporter with the RAND DAILY MAIL, visited Maputo a few weeks ago. On 11 October he reported on the popular demonstrations taking place in Maputo, writing that "hundreds of representatives of party cells, the youth and women's organizations and the unions" had reaffirmed that "military action was the decisive factor in the eradication of the armed bandits."

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## BRIEFS

GAZA SUPPLY MARKETING IMPROVES--Yesterday, in Maputo, the state secretary for supply, Francisco Masquil, said that the plan for supplying products of prime necessity to the population of Gaza improved during the last agricultural campaign, owing to the good harvest of corn and the aid from the international community. Francisco Masquil, who was in Gaza recently to check on the agricultural supply and marketing, also remarked that, in some sections of the province, the drought problem is continuing to make itself felt. He mentioned Chicualacuala District as the one requiring the most support with food products. The state secretary observed that, in the last product marketing campaign, Gaza showed improvement. This year, there is already a special supply program to back up the marketing campaign, particularly that for cashew nuts. This program is now benefiting certain provinces in the northern and central parts of the country which will soon be starting to market the cashews. [Text]  
[Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 17 Oct 84 p 16] 2909

CSO: 3442/55

## NAN ON CONCEPT OF AFRICAN ARMY

AB081105 Lagos NAN in English 0940 GMT 8 Nov 84

[Commentary by James Bello, NAN correspondent in Nairobi: "Does Africa Need a Continental Army?"]

[Text] When Africa heads of state and government meet for the OAU's 20th summit from 12 November, they will be faced with new challenges posed by recent changes on the political landscape of southern Africa. They will be confronted with the fact that since they last gathered to consider the state of the continent, two members of the "frontline states"--Mozambique and Angola--have been "compelled by national interests" to introduce a new element into the liberation struggle in southern Africa by engaging in peaceful dialogue with racist South Africa. Maputo and Pretoria have signed the "Nkomati Accord" which forbids Mozambique from providing bases to freedom fighters of the African National Congress (ANC).

At last February's foreign ministerial council meeting in Addis Ababa, Angola and Mozambique jointly sponsored a resolution seeking endorsement of what they called "the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the governments of Angola and Mozambique to preserve their independence and national sovereignty in seeking a peaceful solution to the serious situation prevailing in southern Africa." They argued that in spite of persistent and obvious threats to their nationhood from racist South Africa, here had been no concrete help from the OAU beyond "mere" expression of solidarity with the frontline states and condemnation of Pretoria.

Although OAU heads of state and government, in one of their numerous resolutions, accepted that "an attack on any member-state is an attack on the entire continent," no effort has ever been made to follow up that resolution with action. This is because even if they have the political will, they lack the economic clout to influence events in that region. Back in the early 1960s, Ghana's first president, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, suggested a continental army to defend Africa's small states from external aggression and to help liberate those areas still under colonial rule. But more than 20 years later, such a force is still to be created even though the need for it is generally acknowledged. Interests in the idea has blown hot and cold. Many leaders publicly support the idea, but most of them have also been wary of its implications. Though there had been a recurrent resolution calling for its creation, it was sent back for further study each time the issue was tabled.

According to the interim secretary general of the OAU, Dr Peter Onu of Nigeria, the need for a continental army is one of the items listed for discussion at the 20th summit. [?This time], the leaders will consider the report of the OAU Defence Commission which met in Accra, Ghana, last January and strongly came out in favour of the formation of the force. The commission was able to agree on a protocol establishing an "African defence organ," which will be presented to the heads of state and government for endorsement. The agreement on the protocol was a major advance in bringing the idea to fruition. At an earlier 7-day meeting in Addis Ababa in April 1981, OAU defense ministers failed to agree on the text of the protocol, a relection of the conflicting perceptions among African states on the need and form of the proposed force. But in Accra, it was interesting to see countries hardly on speaking terms, like Libya and Egypt, in complete agreement on the issue.

Up to now there have been no clear answers to the question of command, equipment and deployment of the force. Yet, these are as important as the legal, financial and political implications that have been getting a fair amount of attention. It is not clear whether these questions were fully answered during the Accra talks. The participants, however, are reported to have decided that the force should be formed on a regional basis and based in Egypt, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Ghana. This is apparently to make the force more manageable.

Nonetheless, the finances needed for an effective force covering the continent and problems of command, given Africa's poor communication facilities, would be overwhelming in 1981, it was estimated that U.S.\$1 billion in contributions from member-states would be needed initially to set it up. But this may be a gross underestimation, considering that the OAU's Chadian peace-keeping experiment showed that even a force of 5,000 troops needed millions of dollars a month to maintain. At that time the OAU was unable to raise the money and had to rely on substantial contributions from outside Africa. Nigeria alone spent more than U.S.\$83 million on the peace-keeping operations.

Now, Mozambique and Angola have decided to make peace with South Africa, in their own national interest--even if it is contrary to the OAU position on southern Africa. If it works, they may no longer need the OAU's defence force. At last January's talks in Accra, a representative of the African National Congress, Mfamatumi Makatini, also said that the nationalist fighters needed money, weapons, and political and diplomatic support but not troops. According to him, "we know we cannot win a conventional war against Pretoria, which is what racists want." This implies that the liberation of African territory will no longer be the main reason for setting up the force. The reason would then be the protection of OAU member-states from external aggression. But such acts of aggression are mostly from South Africa. The only recent exception has been the air clash between Libya and the United States over the gulf of Sidra. The proposed OAU force may therefore be useful only for resolving conflicts between OAU member-states or to repel mercenaries hired by those seeking power at home. Indeed, it was that threat posed by mercenaries and other foreign troops in 1977 and 1978 that first forced African leaders to discuss extensively the need for an African defence force during the 1978 OAU summit meeting in Khartoum, Sudan. There had been the attempts by mercenaries with the apparent support of some African nations, to invade Benin, the



insurgency in Zaire's copper-rich province of Shaba by Angolan-based rebels and Western intervention to save President Mobutu's government from the rebel's attack, the use of mercenaries to reinstate President Ahmed Abdallah in the Comoros, the war in the Ogaden in which Cubans and Soviets came in to back Ethiopia, and the French intervention in Chad.

These events divided African leaders into two camps. Some saw the Cubans and other troops from the socialist bloc as a threat to African nations, but others considered Western troops dotted across the continent to help prop up unpopular leaders as a greater danger to Africa. In the end, the leaders agreed that the "responsibility of defending Africa and ensuring its security should be shouldered by the African peoples alone." They resolved to reactivate the Defence Committee, established when the OAU was formed, to consider "the need to establish an African military force under the supervision of the OAU."

Away from the AOU, many African leaders had already taken measures to ensure collective defence. In November 1977, members of the Francophone West African Economic Community (CEAO)--Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso--signed a nonaggression and defence assistance pact, which had been proposed during that year's Franco-African summit in Dakar, Senegal. In 1981, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also signed a defence pact. Under the agreement, forces from ECOWAS member-states would carry out joint manoeuvres, go to the defence of a member in case of external aggression, or act as a peace-keeping force when member-states were at war.

Nonetheless, whatever OAU leaders may decide on a continental army, interim secretary-general, Dr Onu, recently doubted the possibility of a standing OAU peace-keeping force, "because of the maintenance cost, standardisation of equipment and training." He said: "What is important is to reach an agreement whereby countries can make available a contingent of troops for peace-keeping purposes when needed."

CSO: 3400/172

BRIEFS

YOUTH CORPS HEAD SENTENCED--A former assistant director of the National Youth Service Corps [NYSC], Folorunsho Kila, was today sentenced to life imprisonment for receiving kickbacks, corruptly enriching himself and operating a private business. The Lagos Zone of the Special Military Tribunal on the Recovery of Public Property found him guilty on seven of the eight-count charge. [Excerpt] [Lagos Domestic Service in English 2100 GMT 9 Nov 84 AB]

CSO: 3400/172

OUSTER OF MOUSTAPHA NIASSE EXAMINED

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 12-26 Oct 84 pp 3-4

[Article by Youssoupha Ndiaye: "Moustapha Niasse Is Out...Who Will Be Next?"]

[Text] Senghor had four heirs. Now, after Habib Thiam, Moustapha Niasse, the minister of foreign affairs, has been eliminated. Out of the four, only two are left: Abdou Diouf and Jean Collins. Who will be next? After the period of favor, which began under Senghor, came the disgrace. It came without warning for Moustapha Niasse, the minister of state for foreign affairs, who lost his job through a presidential decree on 9 October last, in the evening.

Recognized earlier as one of the members of the band of four, Senghor's legitimate heirs, along with Abdou Diouf, Jean Collins and Habib Thiam, Moustapha Niasse seemed firmly entrenched, in the eyes of many observers. Nevertheless, he finally fell just as another member of the four, Habib Thiam, had fallen. Both were removed not because they were unpopular. Their mistake was to have consciously or unconsciously offended their comrade Jean Collin.

So two are gone and two remain. The first have in common the fact that they were close to President Abdou Diouf. In the case of Habib Thiam, for example, relations were such that there was a Habib Diouf in the presidential family.

As for Moustapha Niasse, it should be remembered that he played a large role in getting rid of Babacar Ba, the former minister of finance. In fact, as head of Senghor's office staff, who initiated him into politics, Mr. Niasse had a certain influence on presidential decisions.

The points in common do not end there. It was after some low blows, after a campaign of denigration and provocation that they finally left (in Habib Thiam's case) or were forced out of (in Mr Niasse's case) the presidential court.

Thus, we could see for some time an anti-Moustapha Niasse campaign. What didn't they say about him? That he drove a brand new Jaguar in the middle of an austerity period. That he left for Mecca while all the

vactioning ministers remained at home... Without counting certain accusations which resulted in the famous fight between Moustapha Niasse and Djibo Ka, right in the politburo of the PS [Socialist Party], under the eyes of President Abdou Diouf.

Of these accusations, we can accept the one citing lack of respect and restraint on the part of Moustapha Niasse in relations with the president. This serious failing was just as true for Djibo Ka, all the more so since, according to certain sources, President Abdou Diouf had been warned earlier by his former protege about the behavior of his minister of information.

#### The PS Case

What is important to note about the Moustapha-Djibo fight is that the former was the product of Senghor; the second was entirely invented by the first. And, because of this, Senghor played a protective role concerning his protege, who, out of necessity, was "taking good care of him." Once Senghor had left, the situation changed. Djibo Ka now reported directly to President Abdou Diouf, without the need for protection from Moustapha Niasse.

Which means in other words that it was purely an in-house PS matter. If it had been a political movement which was concerned with social justice, the sanction, if this is indeed one, would have had to affect both boxers. But in the logic of the PS, the Ministry of Information was spared. Perhaps because it had just barely undergone the sacrifice of two of its members (the director of radio broadcasting and its chief editor) following a struggle between two powers, the power of the state and the power of the "brotherhood."

#### Low Blows

The essential thing in this business is not so much the personality of a Moustapha Niasse or of a Habib Thiam yesterday. What is much more important are the low blows exchanged by men of this stature in order to remain at the helm. Such behavior is contrary to the ethics of the Senegalese population, which is mostly Moslem. This population believes in sincere friendship and condemns low blows wherever they come from. Why could we not relive a person of his functions in the simplest way without denigration or provocation? Do we really need all these artifices to "rub out" someone? Surely not,

Nevertheless, that practice has become the rule in the PS.

To get rid of the so-called barons of the regime, they had not "beaten about the bush." "Ballot box stuffers," "obstructionists," "grafters,"... all these words were used to describe them as the perpetrators of the chaos, of the graft and of the laxity, which we have seen within the PS and the bodies heading the state. And, finally, they were completely eradicated from the government. Nevertheless, the situation has gotten worse.

The barons were also criticized for being the main perpetrators of the unexpected appointments of non-representative people to the head of these directing bodies. This practice has continued in spite of the departure of these "stirrers of troubled waters," and the speeches of the secretary general. Tomorrow will be clear, he kept telling the congress. Now what do we find? There were dead and wounded in Casamanche, and in the Saloum after the renewal operations at the grassroots level of the PS. Dead and wounded because of this practice they said they were fighting.

To return to Moustapha Niasse, one fact stands out. Of the four left by Senghor to assure his legacy, there are only two remaining: Abdou Diouf and Jean Collin. As for the latter, rumors call him the "hatchet man." Among his victims they cite Ousmane Seck, Habib Thiam and now the former minister of foreign affairs who is turning over his portfolio to Ibrahima Fall, who is leaving the Ministry of Higher Education. After Moustapha Niasse whose turn will it be?

8956

CSO: 3419/106



SWA MEETS CUBAN DELEGATION

Victoria NATION in French 2 Oct 84 pp 1, 10

Text The role played by the SWA Seychelles Women's Association in the country's socio-economic and cultural development was stressed yesterday at a meeting of SWA national committee members with a delegation of Cuban women now visiting Seychelles.

Mme Vilma Salinas, a member of the national committee and national secretariat of the FMC Cuban Womens' Federation, and Mme Nancy Iglesias, an official of the FMC's external affairs department, have been in Seychelles since last Thursday on a one-week visit at the invitation of the SWA.

During the day the Cuban delegation, accompanied by Mme Jessy Freminot, SWA secretary, visited the SWA workshop at Le Chantier and the garment industry facilities at Mont Fleuri.

Mme Salinas said she was much impressed by SWA efforts to help the young women of Seychelles learn as useful a craft as needlework.

"You have done a great deal in a very short time," she said.

The Cuban delegation also laid a wreath at the Zonn Lib monument to the Seychelles revolution.

The group will meet today with Jeremie Bonelame, secretary general at the Ministry of Education and Information, and will visit the Anse Boileau day nursery.

The Cuban delegation began its visit last week by meeting with James Michel, deputy secretary general of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front.

6145

CSO: 3419/84

## BRIEFS

JOINT COMMISSION WITH ALGERIA--The first meeting of the Algerian-Seychellois joint commission will be held from 6 to 10 October in Algiers. Seychelles will be represented by a three-member delegation. Delegates will be Mme Danielle de St. Jorre, Secretary General of the Ministry of Planning and External Relations; M Zotique Pragassen, Director of the National Pedagogical Institute; and M Arnold Chety, an economist. The Algerian-Seychellois joint commission was established following President Rene's visit to Algeria last July. Its purpose is to examine projects for which Algeria might lend financial support. The forthcoming meeting will study various projects for cooperation related to the economic development of Seychelles. [Text] [Victoria NATION in French 5 Oct 84 p 1] 6145

CSO: 3419/84

MINISTER BARRE INVITES PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Bonn AFRIKA-POST in German Oct 84 pp 10-11

[Interview with Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre of Somalia by Erwin E.Hirschmann; date and place not specified: "Somalia Looking for Private Investors"]

[Text] Relations between Mogadishu and Bonn as well as the situation in the Horn of Africa were the central topics of an AFRIKA-POST interview with Somalia's Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre by Erwin E.Hirschmann.

[Question] Mr Minister, following the Mogadishu incident, a new era in the relations between Somalia and the Federal Republic of Germany began. Nonetheless, visitors coming from Somalia over the past several months have complained—albeit privately—that the German government has not been living up to the promises it made then. Is that what you feel, too? And did you and your government expect more from Bonn?

[Answer] Well, let me say first of all that relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Somalia are excellent and that they are improving with every passing day. But in day-to-day relations there are always a few things that might be worked out a little better. In that sense, you, for instance, might well feel that we in our country ought to be better organized than we are at present. And we sometimes feel that some things should move faster. But to get back to your question: cooperation between the FRG and Somalia at the government level is excellent. What we would like to see is a greater commitment from the private sector. We need more private investment and we have been mentioning this idea and this request of ours for years. When our president visited your beautiful country, he also met with representatives of German industry and tried to convince them of the advantages of investing in Somalia's future. Nonetheless, there has been relatively little progress in this field. That is why we must make a joint effort—and that includes the German and the Somali side—to get the business community, particularly in your country, to realize what great opportunities there are in expanding private investment in Somalia.

[Question] Did you also raise this question in the course of your visit to the FRG ?

[Answer] Yes. In all the talks I had I pointed out this need of ours. Let me emphasize once again: I believe that a greater private sector commitment would strengthen cooperation between our two countries to the advantage of both. The people I talked to expressed great interest in this matter and for that reason I hope we will be able to realize at least some of our ideas in the none too distant future.

[Question] To raise private sector interest in Somalia, there is a need for an environment which facilitates such investment. But your region—the Horn of Africa—is among the less stable areas of this world. And here in the FRG there is still fear that a new war between Somalia and Ethiopia might make the situation even worse.

[Answer] I do not think that such a threat of war exists. First of all, one has to start out from the situation as it really is—and the fact is that our nation, namely Somalia, has had a stable system for a long time. To be sure, we did have some problems in foreign relations—at one time with Ethiopia and prior to that also with the Soviet Union; but all the current problems in the region have only indirectly to do with Somalia when you stop to think about it. As far as the unstable situation in Ethiopia is concerned, there is little Somalia can do about it. We have nothing to do with it because Somalia and Ethiopia are two entirely different states which differ both in terms of structure and the composition of their population. In Ethiopia, you have many nationalities and many contradictions within one population. Somalia, on the other hand, is the home of only one group and frictions such as exist among the various population groups in Ethiopia—we simply do not have any. Next to Kenya, Somalia is the only country in the region which encourages private investment on the basis of its population structure and its philosophy as an oasis of stability.

[Question] That still leaves the Ogaden question. If Somali statements are to be believed, the issue still has not been resolved. Do you consider the Ogaden a part of Somalia or are you looking for some other kind of arrangement ?

[Answer] Well, we have made our position on this issue clear on a number of occasions. We have never claimed the Ogaden as part of Somalia. All we are doing is to demand the right to self-determination for the people who live there. The population of the Ogaden should make up its mind and decide what it wants to do. If the majority of the population wants a state of their own, we will accept that—just as we would accept a majority decision in favor of staying with Ethiopia or in favor of becoming part of Somalia. That and nothing else is our position. Let me make myself clear

once again: We are asking for no more and no less than that those directly concerned, namely the people of the Ogaden, are asked what they want to do.

[Question] In your entire region there is a steadily growing threat of greater involvement on the part of the two superpowers. That did not start with the discovery of the mines at the entrance to the Egyptian Suez Canal.

[Answer] We have a very clear position on this point. We are opposed to permanent bases of one of the two superpowers. Since you have raised the issue of the mines in the Red Sea, let me point out to you that the passages between the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea are narrow and that problems in one part of the region concern the other part as well. We want to see the Horn of Africa become a region of peace in the broadest sense and to keep it free from superpower involvement. At the same time, we ask that extra-African forces—by which I mean the two superpowers—do not interfere in our affairs. This position is shared by a large number of governments and you can tell that it is, if I mention to you that I will shortly be visiting Khartoum in order to meet with my counterparts from the littoral states of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

[Question] Mr Minister, you said you are opposed to superpower bases in the region. But the U.S. Navy does have landing rights in one Somali port. Isn't that something of a contradiction ?

[Answer] No, not at all. The United States are a nation with which we have friendly relations and ships of its navy may call at our ports. The same thing also applies to German ships for that matter. These visiting rights have no bearing on the security situation in the region. We are merely opposed to firm military agreements. As you know, another superpower maintains five bases in Ethiopia and that very fact is a point which poses a threat to the region. But if a friendly country calls at our ports with its warships and stays there for 3 or 4 days, I do not think that something like that should be cause for concern to anyone. And that is exactly what the agreement we have concluded with the United States is like.

9478

CSO: 3420/13



**TRADE UNION OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED**

**RSA Trade Unions President Interviewed**

**Johannesburg LEADERSHIP SA in English 1984-85 pp 9-11**

**[Interview with Chris Dlamini, president of the Federation of SA Trade Unions]**

**[Text]** Leadership SA: Unionists have complained that the last six months have seen a hardening of employer attitudes. Do you agree?

Dlamini: Yes, there has been some change for the worse in their attitudes. Many of them are hiding behind the recession to bash unions. A common problem is that they are not willing to recognise the presence of shop stewards, or worker representatives, in the factory. Employers tend to see the shop stewards as a threat when they raise worker complaints. They use the recession to threaten them with unemployment when they raise worker demands. Sometimes employers retrench workers immediately they fear they have joined a union.

LSA: You say employers are hiding behind the recession. But surely the recession is serious? Doesn't this mean that employers simply have less to offer workers right now?

Dlamini: They say they can't increase wages, but they conveniently ignore the fact that it is the black workers who are suffering most, particularly from the drought. Some workers have relied on crops in the rural areas which have failed, and the rise in general sales tax and in basic food prices have hit workers hard.

Employers are ignoring the extent to which black workers are feeling the pinch. The price rises mean workers are earning next to nothing - they are battling to survive. Employers don't have any problems about surviving.

LSA: Besides wages, what other worker demands arising out of the recession are employers resisting?

Dlamini: One important issue for us is that we have asked them to reduce working hours so that more work is created. But they won't budge. They use the same argument as they use on other issues - that our productivity is not high enough to allow them to cut the hours.

But we don't accept this argument about productivity at all. We believe this is management's responsibility.

We also believe we are entitled to shorter hours because some companies are automating their plants and others have already done so. This means they can produce more units in less time, so there is no reason why they should not be able to afford shorter hours. But they are trying to automate at the expense of the worker. Those machines were bought with money earned from the sweat of workers and workers must therefore get some benefit from them.

LSA: Does this mean you've accepted automation - or is this an issue which you will fight in the future?

Dlamini: We don't go along with automation at all, but we were caught napping by it. Had we realised the effects we would have fought it.

Now that we know what it does to workers' jobs, we are starting to take it up.

For example, we are now demanding that companies notify the unions when they intend changing their production methods and using machines. If they answer the way they have on some other issues, that this is a management prerogative, then there is a real risk of unrest. Workers have resisted retrenchment in many companies and they know now that automation often means retrenchment.

**LSA:** How successful have workers and unions been in resisting retrenchment? After all, despite the resistance you mention, tens of thousands of workers have lost their jobs.

**Dlamini:** I believe we've achieved a lot, mainly in reducing the number of workers who were retrenched. The important thing is for workers to unite in a factory where they face retrenchment. We have found that where they do this, the management then agrees to negotiate and to reduce the number who are going to lose jobs. In some places, the number to be retrenched has been cut by half because of this.

**LSA:** You've mentioned several areas in which you say worker demands have been met by management saying that you are encroaching on their prerogatives. Are there any others?

**Dlamini:** Yes, training is another example. We keep on hearing that job reservation has ended, but it hasn't, because Whites still get far more training opportunities than black workers and the result is that Blacks remain as operators, rather than skilled workers. We want a say over who is trained so that we can ensure that black workers get the training which would allow them to become skilled. Once again, managements tell us that this is their prerogative, to decide who is going to be trained and how far.

But this affects workers. It must be challenged.

**LSA:** This question of management prerogatives seems to be at the heart of a lot of the employer criticism of unions at present. For example, the chairman of Barlow Rand, Mike Rosholt, recently accused Fosatu, in effect, of trying to destroy free enterprise by demanding the right to tell management how to run factories. How do you respond to this?

**Dlamini:** One of the problems with employers here is that they have had a free hand to do whatever they like with

workers for so long. They are used to being allowed to do what they like without anyone challenging them. But the decisions in which we are demanding a say affect workers. They can't expect us to sit back and remain silent about decisions which affect our lives.

They want to have their cake and eat it – they want to continue doing what they have done in the past, which is to treat workers as production commodities rather than people and they also want workers to keep quiet about this.

An example of the extent to which employers still treat workers as commodities is the metal industry where Seifsa has just got the government to change migrant workers' contracts so that they can get rid of these workers at one day's notice.

Workers are realising now that they have a right to a say in all the matters affecting them and that is our demand – a say in every decision in the factory which affects us. But it is totally wrong to say that we are trying to control the factories. Our goal is joint decision-making, that workers and employers jointly decide all issues which affect workers.

**LSA:** How far does this go? Would you, for example, demand a say over a company's investment decisions, where it is to set up new plants, and so on?

**Dlamini:** We haven't got to that yet. But one of these decisions we definitely object to is where companies move their plants from an area where there is a strong union to a rural area where they are going to be able to exploit workers.

We see this happen when employers invest in the so-called homelands and set up plants there. This means they can hide behind the anti-union laws in these areas and use these to exploit workers. We believe that moving to the homelands is an attempt by employers to avoid dealing with the unions and to benefit from the exploitation which goes on in those areas. This is totally unacceptable to us.

**LSA:** Many senior employees seem to see Fosatu as a socialist organisation which wants to overthrow the present economic system. Is that accurate?

**Dlamini:** Individuals in Fosatu have a variety of viewpoints, some may be socialists, others not. But Fosatu's aims are very clear: We want all people to be treated the same, and our objective is to prevent

workers being exploited and socially degraded. We believe that, whatever the economic system, workers must be brought into the whole system if it is going to work for them. We want a word for workers in the running of the economy, and in the running of production in the plant.

Our goal is that workers must have a say in the running of their lives and we would support any system which allows that.

**LSA: How about Fosatu's political involvement? Many employers seemed shocked when you campaigned last year to influence voting in the referendum on the constitution.**

Dlamini: People who were shocked by that are short-sighted. Fosatu has always stood for equality and for non-racialism. We have workers of different races in our unions and we don't want workers to be divided racially. The new constitution would divide workers in this way so it is obvious that we must oppose it because it affects us. We must also oppose any other laws which affect workers or threaten them.

Because we stand for non-racialism, it is also obvious that we must stand for one man, one vote. This has always been the case.

**LSA: Will you be taking up political issues in the future?**

Dlamini: Where workers are affected, yes. There are many issues in the townships – housing, rents and so on, which affect workers directly and you can't expect a worker organisation to remain silent on them. We have taken them up in the past and we will do so in the future.

**LSA: But at the same time, you are also opposed to joining organisations like the United Democratic Front and to allying yourself directly with community organisations.**

Dlamini: Yes, we have made it clear that, although we are involved in these issues, we want to maintain a worker identity when we do so. We are trying to build an independent worker movement, and this means we cannot affiliate to any political organisation.

Another reason for our attitude is that we do not want to create divisions within Fosatu. Here in the Transvaal we have

organisations like Azapo and the UDF and some workers may belong to either organisation. In Natal, we have Inkatha and some might belong to that. If we were to decide, say, in Natal, to join up with Inkatha, we would then face problems from our members up here.

Although we refuse to join these organisations or link up with them permanently, we would support them if they take up issues affecting our members and campaign for rights which would benefit workers. But at the same time we want to look at our own campaign strategies and develop them according to our own needs.

For the moment, that means that campaigns will be run by the unions themselves, independently. One example is the Coloured and Indian elections to elect people to the new Parliaments. We will definitely be campaigning for a boycott, but we will be devising our own strategies on how to try to persuade people not to vote.

**LSA: In general, where you have taken up these issues, you have been challenging management on them, rather than the government. But management says it is not responsible for the government's decisions.**

Dlamini: We could change our approach at some stage, but I believe that it has been the correct one up to now. Employers are directly responsible for the townships. They had them built so that they could have a black workforce living near their factories and working in them, so they are also responsible for conditions in those townships. It is also obvious to us that management will always support the government. They are involved in the machinery which makes the laws and we are not.

If we go to an Administration Board, for example, and complain that they are overcharging on rents, they don't listen. They say the computer is broken or they threaten people with eviction if they complain. But if management is involved, we have a stronger voice on our behalf, then they do have to listen.

Besides which, government decisions obviously affect the demands we are going to make to employers. If the government raises sales tax, we are going to ask for an increase. The same applies if rents or bus fares go up.

**LSA:** Do you see all managements as part of the system?

**Dlamini:** Yes, you only have to look at the way they work with the police. When workers go on strike, many managements call in the police to crush the workers. But when workers are locked out by a company, they can't call in the police and get them to open the gates.

We have also seen, as I mentioned earlier, how employers like Seifsa can say that the pass laws have nothing to do with them, but then get the government to change workers contracts when it suits them.

**LSA:** But what about the managements who don't call the police, who do talk to workers and unions?

**Dlamini:** They are also seen by workers as part of the system. All these employers sit in the same employer associations as the ones who treat workers and unions harshly. They could use their influence if they wanted to get the others to change their behaviour. But they don't. They stay in the employer association and let the others carry on. We believe they are therefore responsible for the behaviour of the others.

**LSA:** What specifically have you been doing to try to get employers to intervene in community problems and how successful have you been?

**Dlamini:** Well, at one plant management was approached on rents, for example, because workers were being forced to pay exorbitant rents. We were successful - management agreed on a system where they deduct money from workers and then they pay it to the Board. Now the workers no longer have to pay these excessive rents.

Through the Fosatu structures, workers in other factories in the area are now planning to take up similar problems with their employers. But we don't know whether this will have the same success, because it hasn't got off the ground yet.

Workers in the Katlehong area also approached their management to sign a petition on the Orderly Movement Bill. We wanted them to support us in opposing it because it will uproot workers from where they live and work. Some did sign, but many did not, so we don't know where they stand on this.

On the East Rand, we have also planned to start zone committees in the townships.

made up of union members who will identify the community issues in their areas and take these up. These haven't got off the ground yet, but the idea of workers acting in the community is working. For example, shop stewards and community organisations recently got involved in trying to get a particular decision by Putco reversed and they succeeded. This is taking off very effectively.

**LSA:** You said earlier that employers still treat workers as commodities. Isn't this unfair? Haven't there been major changes over the last five years in that many employers are now prepared to advance workers and negotiate with them?

**Dlamini:** There has been some change, but all of it has been the result of pushing from the workers and worker organisations. Employers haven't done these things because they wanted to. But even then there hasn't been enough change.

For example, I don't see how companies can say they have done a lot for workers when, in the metal industry for example, most of the black workers are still getting R1,53 an hour and the Whites are getting R5 or more. We still have a divided workforce in which the white workers get almost all the benefits. We want equality, that is what we are fighting for.

**LSA:** Are you saying that all workers should receive the same wage? Aren't some more skilled than others?

**Dlamini:** Yes, but they get their skills from training and from the fact that there was job reservation for years which made sure that only Whites had the skills. Employers are not trying to compensate for this by training Blacks to make up for the years in which we were not allowed to do those jobs. So most of the skilled workers are still white and the unskilled and semi-skilled are still black. That is why we say there will be no equality until proper training is provided.



**LSA:** The East Rand was at one stage a major focus of worker militancy and of unionism. What is the position now? Hasn't the recession and management resistance weakened unionism here?

**Dlamini:** We are growing stronger all the time here despite management resistance. The recession has been a problem and there have been fewer signs of worker militancy because workers are still rebuilding their strategies and working out the best tactics for the situation. But this hasn't affected their interest in unionism. This is still growing.

**LSA:** What is your view on the union unity initiative? Some unionists seem convinced that a federation of six major emerging unions will be born before the end of the year.

**Dlamini:** We are starting to see definite progress in achieving unity. Until recently, we were getting very disillusioned with the unity talks: workers were saying that we were wasting time and money on them because they seemed to be going nowhere. Now I think we are making a lot of progress and we could, at least, have a feasibility document to take to our members by the end of the year.

**LSA:** What effect would unity have on the union movement?

**Dlamini:** We will be strengthened, because we will then be able to take up issues collectively instead of in the isolated way we do now. We will be able to run nationwide campaigns on issues affecting workers, which we haven't really been able to do yet: If we wanted a national minimum wage, for example, we would be in a much stronger position to campaign for it.

It would also have an effect in the factories, because workers would no longer see themselves as isolated, but as part of a national movement.

**LSA:** Many employers believe that organisations like Fosatu are dominated by a handful of white officials. Do you see the presence of white officials as a problem?


**Dlamini:** No, they don't dominate Fosatu – they couldn't, even if they wanted to. We are a democratic organisation and all officials are responsible to union executives, most of whose members are black. They take their instructions from the executives. All decisions in Fosatu are thrashed out thoroughly by executive committees at every level and it is impossible for any individual to dominate.

Because of this, the race of officials in Fosatu has not been an issue and there has been little resistance from black union members to working with white officials.

**LSA:** Finally, what do you see as the issues most on workers' minds right now? What sort of issues and demands do unions see as priorities?

**Dlamini:** Pension funds are still an important issue. We don't accept the pension system initiated by management and we want a say in it. Another issue which is growing in importance in this area (the East Rand) is the rights of women workers – particularly the demand for maternity leave agreements. And, particularly in the textile factories and the foundries, health and safety is an issue which workers will be taking up increasingly.

Obviously, retrenchment is still an issue – we totally reject the idea that workers should be retrenched and will continue to try to fight it. As I mentioned earlier, automation, which takes jobs from workers, is something we are beginning to oppose.

But the real issue is that, despite the changes we hear about, workers are still not involved in company decision-making. This is the main problem and the one which worries workers most. 



## Council General Secretary Interviewed

Johannesburg LEADERSHIP SA in English 1984-85 pp 130-132

[Interview with Arthur Grobbelaar, general secretary of the Trade Union Council of SA by Tony Koenderman]

[Text] **Koenderman:** How big and how important is Tucsa in the South African labour relations environment?

Grobbelaar: Tucsa is still far and away the largest and most representative federation of trade unions in South Africa. At the moment our membership consists of roughly 450 000 persons and I must emphasise that those 450 000 people are true members in the sense that their affiliation fees are paid. This is what we base our membership figures on, not on any sort of membership which is not contributing towards the organisation. If one takes into account the fact that there is always a certain membership percentage of the trade unions in arrears with their subscriptions, then probably Tucsa would represent in excess of 600 000 people. The trade unions affiliated with Tucsa are generally found in the private sector. We have only a fairly small number in the public sector. Of the 51 trade unions, most of them are completely non racial in character with membership from all the different population groups: Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Indians.

**Koenderman:** Could you give a breakdown by race of your membership?

Grobbelaar: We don't worry too much about this because as far as we are concerned there are just members, but the approximate figure is 105 000 persons belonging to the white population group, about 110 000 persons belonging to the black population and the balance of some 200 000-odd belonging to the coloured and Indian population groups. In percentage terms, roughly then, Tucsa consists of 23 per cent Whites, 24 per cent Blacks and approximately 53 per cent Coloureds and Indians.

**Koenderman:** What do you see as the major challenges facing the labour movement at the moment?

Grobbelaar: The most serious fundamental challenge facing the trade union movement is the question of standards of employment being eroded due to the very poor economic situation that we are in at

the moment. The second problem that faces us is the large number of unemployed people, which means a lot of the union members are unemployed.

This in turn leads to a decline in the importance of the trade unions concerned - their becoming less representative in some respects than they were before. It has also led to a shortfall in income, which is quite an important point with trade unions since they invariably operate on shoestring finances.

Besides those two major issues I think another important issue which is certainly going to face the trade union movement in the fairly near future, is the question of changes in technology. This is a real headache for the trade union movement, particularly in some sectors. With the increasing introduction of both automatic and/or computerised machinery we are finding that this is adding to our unemployment problems. A classic example was the indication recently of a particular company engaged in telephone manufacture of having to lay off nearly 700 people as the result of the introduction of the microchip into their telephones. But we are getting it in other areas as well. The unions, for example, in the insurance and the banking sectors are very concerned about the increasing introduction of automated accounting. They are concerned about the automatic tellers, the money dispensers. I think they are also concerned about the advent of plastic money. All of these things are important to us.

We don't think that enough money is being spent on training and retraining to meet these challenges. There seems to be a very mistaken attitude on the part of employers that just because the economic climate is not good that almost the first cut they must make is in training and retraining, when in actual fact they should be increasing their training and retraining programmes to meet the demand for skilled labour which will become more and more important once the economy is back on a growth basis. Bearing in mind that employment has recovered up to 12 per cent of the gross

curred in training, we can't see why they are not continuing with it. It is a very shortsighted policy.

**Koenderman:** Didn't the government reduce the tax benefit related to training in the last budget?

Grobbelaar: Not really. What government has said in no uncertain terms is that there has been a tremendous amount of abuse taking place insofar as government subsidies are concerned and it has limited the types of people that can receive training by companies in order to receive the subsidies. It has said that persons earning over R15 000 a year are not people that companies should be able to claim subsidies for any longer. There are those who feel this eliminates a lot of people from training. This might be true to some extent, but within trade unions I would say that almost 100% of trainees in some shape or another fall under that R15 000 barrier. One has got to consider exactly what apprentice wages consist of; one has to consider what wages apply insofar as semi-skilled workers are concerned to try to train them into a more skilled occupation; one has got to look at various types of trainees and they virtually all fall under that R15 000 level.

**Koenderman:** How would you define Tucsa's role in labour relations in South Africa, bearing in mind that we are talking about a rapidly changing era?

Grobbelaar: Tucsa is an organisation which exists on the basis of voluntary membership. There is no compulsion upon any trade union to join Tucsa. Secondly, the unions that join Tucsa are completely autonomous. In terms of our constitution we are prohibited from interfering in the domestic affairs of member unions. In other words, what I am trying to say is this: When it comes to the actual practise of industrial relations, when it comes to the interface of relationship between the employee, the employers and the trade unions, Tucsa does not come into that interface situation. This is something which is engaged in by the individual trade unions.

They negotiate their conditions of employment in the various industrial sectors. They negotiate all sorts of other things with their employers. The council exists fundamentally to provide services, advice, assistance – and we can assist unions with

any specific problems which they might have, if they request us to do so. But other than that we take up issues as determined at annual conferences of the council which loosely fall under the category of "national issues" which are basically issues of common concern. Whether these be issues which relate to income tax, education, health, transport services or whatever, this is where the council's main field of functioning is. It is of making representations, of attempting to bring about improvements in any one of a number of diverse fields.

**Koenderman:** Do you see the emerging union groupings like Fosatu and Cusa as a threat to Tucsa?

Grobbelaar: Fundamentally, no. I think this has been very much over-played in the sense that they pose a threat to Tucsa as such. Some of the unions in those two organisations, Cusa and Fosatu, do constitute a threat for individual Tucsa affiliates because they are operating in the same industries, the same sectors of the economy as some of the Tucsa unions. But they are not really a threat to Tucsa. I still believe that despite the very real differences which exist between Tucsa and organisations like Fosatu and Cusa, closer co-operation must come about. Certain fundamental differences will continue to remain between the different bodies be they ideological, philosophical or political. I think this is inevitable. But there again, I don't think it is anything to worry about. It's certainly not something which is unique to South Africa – to have divisions within the trade union movement – these exist all over the world.

Fortunately, up until now we haven't been divided on some of the grounds on which division occurs elsewhere in the world. The classic example is that of religious difference. For example, in Europe it is quite common to have a very, very divisive situation between the Catholic trade union group and the Socialistic trade union group. These things are real. Sometimes it even emerges as differences between the Catholic and Protestant type trade unions. Fortunately, we have not had that in South Africa up to now but undoubtedly we will get that along with the other seven plagues of Egypt.

**Koenderman:** An article in the Tucsa newspaper, the *Labour Mirror*, recently described the international campaign aimed at polarising South African workers along

racial and ideological lines. One certainly gets the impression, from some sources anyway, that people perceive some of the emerging unions as being more representative than Tucsa is of black aspirations. They suggest that Tucsa doesn't have a role to play for Blacks. What is your reaction to that?

Grobbelaar: That is largely wishful thinking on the part of some of these organisations but once again one has got to take certain realities into account. I don't think it can be denied that an organisation like Cusa is black and seeks black exclusiveness. They have made this very clear and plain. So obviously, there is a deep division between Tucsa and Cusa on this question. Tucsa is not exclusively white or black or anything else. It is truly a non-racial body.

By the same token, there are differences of, I would say, ideology between Tucsa and Fosatu. We discern Fosatu, rightly or wrongly as being more of a socialistic trade union movement, in the sense that we tend to identify it with the form of socialistic trade union movement which is quite common in Europe, but which could hardly be said to exist in North America. So, I think deep divisions are there as well. Having said that there are these deep divisions on questions of ideology, philosophy, political viewpoints and attitudes, I nonetheless believe there are certain issues in which a common front could be presented. I don't think we are divided on the question of unemployment insurance benefits and/or forms of job protection and/or forms of compensation for loss of employment. I don't think we are divided on questions of compensation for industrial accidents. I think we could largely see eye to eye on the questions and issues of improved education and training for everybody.

So there are numerous issues in which a common front could be presented.

**Koenderman: How will you cope with the anti-Tucsa literature entering the country? What response are you going to make?**

Grobbelaar: In the first place one has got to accept that Tucsa is not and never has been immune from attacks. Our whole history from the time of our founding in 1954 has been that of attacks being made upon us from both the left and the right. In our earliest years of formation the attacks from the right were much heavier than the attacks from the left were, since the left hardly existed. I use those terms left and

right as rather simplistic descriptions, but they are here. Probably the attack today is more from the left. This appears to be the indication but as I say, we are not strangers to this type of attack. We have succeeded in overcoming and I think we will succeed in overcoming the present crop.

**Koenderman: A couple of unions have broken away from Tucsa apparently because they thought Tucsa was too conservative. What is your reaction to that?**

Grobbelaar: I accept that some unions might believe that Tucsa is too conservative. This is completely true otherwise all unions from the left would possibly be in Tucsa. One has got to accept that a lot of the rightist trade unions that are also not in Tucsa aren't because they believe Tucsa is too radical. So Tucsa in effect lands up as a middle of the road organisation in some respects. It must also be accepted that it is impossible to please everyone. I'm always intrigued by these rather unfortunate comments that are made from time to time about unity as being the all important and the ultimate in success. Everybody wants unity. I don't think it is only in the trade union movement that unity is wanted. I think the churches seek it, in politics unity is sought. But we have to accept the realities of life. I think you are always going to have divisions of opinion.

**Koenderman: One example of this was the Neill Aggett funeral. As I understand it, Tucsa distanced itself from the protest and I think the reason was that it was a political event. Would you do the same again?**

Grobbelaar: I think it went even a bit further than that. Our initial reactions to what happened in that tragic incident – it was a tragic incident – was that we could not go along with the extravagant language that was being used to describe it. Our second reason was we knew absolutely nothing about the person concerned. We were told that he was a trade union leader and by canvassing among our people we attempted to establish who and what he was, who he was connected with and invariably we came up with a zero answer. Nobody knew anything about him. So we were left in the unfortunate position of saying in effect: Must we now start to make strong protests, must we now start to take up a case, must we now identify ourselves with certain interests when we don't even know what those interests are?

**Koenderman:** Some unions tend to be very militant. Could you define your philosophy or policy in advancing the interest of workers?

Grobbelaar: This thing is largely a question of tactics. Tucsa's overall philosophy in this regard, and I think it is the individual unions that comprise Tucsa's philosophy, is that strike is a weapon of last resort, not first recourse. I think that fundamentally sums it up. If one can achieve through unadvertised approaches, negotiations and pressures what one seeks to achieve then it is rather foolish to embroil workers in what can be a non-productive strike. What has got to be remembered here is the fact that unfortunately the record of achievement of those that have been striking over the last couple of years has been in the main that zero has been achieved. Or if something has been achieved it has been of such small magnitude that it takes literally years for the workers concerned to recover what they lost during the strike period.

**Koenderman:** Do you think South Africa is in for a period of increasing labour unrest in the Eighties?

Grobbelaar: I would be more inclined to say that South Africa could probably expect in the course of the next couple of years more or less the same degree of industrial unrest and militant trade union activity that it is presently experiencing. I would be inclined to the view that there will be not much of a sharp increase in this type of activity. We constantly get told by many disillusioned workers that they would not engage in a strike action again, they have looked around. Too many people are inclined to think that the average worker is stupid and that he can't assess the situation and that he doesn't add up the cost. And how many of these ordinary workers say to us, "How is it that you people have effected improvements and you haven't been striking?" And then we have to try to explain to them that we use different tactics, which are perhaps not as sensational but which bring much more in the way of measurable rewards.

**Koenderman:** Do you feel the Industrial Council system is working adequately?

Grobbelaar: In general, yes. There are certainly individual examples where it is not working as well as it should be. But here again one has got to recognise that industrial councils are autonomous bodies.

They are purely voluntary institutions where employers and trade unions decide to come together and form an industrial council believing it is in the best interest of both parties. Some of the industrial councils I think could do a lot to improve their function. We have furnished certain guidelines, the Department of Manpower has furnished certain guidelines, the subject has been debated at length and some of the industrial councils – perhaps some of the worst offenders – have adapted themselves more to present-day requirements. In general, the industrial council system is a good system. It is a system which can bring very definite benefits to both sides. But having said that, I am not saying that it can't be improved upon or it needn't be adaptable to changed situations. It is sufficiently flexible enough to allow for changes.

**Koenderman:** Are there any improvements you would like to see?

Grobbelaar: One of the major mistakes made by industrial councils, and I have said this on a number of occasions, is that in the first place industrial councils seem rather loath to spell out what their functions and activities are, what they actually do in a particular industry. Consequently, all the criticism that has been expressed about industrial councils – criticism of rather a sensational nature – is something which industrial councils should seek to rectify. They should become a little bit more open about their activities. I think they can do this in various ways. They can explain to the worker members of the trade unions through the medium of the trade unions exactly what they do, what they don't do, what their functions are, why they exist, and so on. I think this education is even needed among employers who are members of the employer party to the industrial council and in this way they could overcome a lot of their difficulties. Having said this, there are some industrial councils, who have done nothing about it, who don't have adequate dispute settling machinery, whose machinery is a little bit rusty from non-use, whose functioning is not as good as it should be.

**Koenderman:** In general, in the last few years since the new labour dispensation following the Wiehahn Commission Reports, the situation seems to have settled down into a pattern. Are you happy with the pattern as it exists at the moment and do you see it changing much in the years ahead.



Grobbelaar: I am reasonably happy with the pattern at the moment. I think necessary adjustments to the system are being made. By the same token, I think anybody with any reasonable amount of intelligence also undoubtedly accepts there will be further adjustments to the system. There will be further changes as a result of the pressures that come to bear, and as a result of the changing nature of the society we live in. This is not bad, this is good. If something changes in order to move with the times, this is certainly good. ■

CSO: 3400/167



## FORD OFFICIAL ON EASTERN CAPE LABOR SITUATION

Johannesburg LEADERSHIP SA in English 1984-85 pp 108-112

[Article by Fred Ferreira]

[Text]

**T**he Eastern Cape labour situation – that prevailing in the industrial areas of Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth and East London – has unquestionably been different thus far from that prevailing elsewhere in the country.

This difference has earned for the Eastern Cape the dubious distinction of being the first to have experienced major strikes under the “new” labour dispensation (post-Wiehahn) and also resulted in more strikes, stoppages and lost man-hours than any other region, in relation to the number of people employed.

What makes this distinction even more dubious, at least from the point of view of employers in other areas, is that these experiences did not remain confined to the Eastern Cape.

What was initially seen, and shrugged off, as the effect of bad or weak management practices, soon spread throughout the entire country, to be followed by wave upon wave of labour unrest surrounding issues which continued to emerge in the East Cape.

These issues included such diverse matters as union registration and recognition, the living wage concept, job security, severance pay and transfer of pensions, and it soon became clear that the Eastern Cape was not suffering a management malaise; rather, it had become the crucible of labour unrest in South Africa – what was happening here today would be happening elsewhere tomorrow.

Why is the Eastern Cape different? Prob-

ably not too many people will hold the view that the quality of management is deficient, although it is not impossible that those factors which make labour different do not find management impervious to their influences. The factors which distinguish the Eastern Cape from most other areas include the following:

- ☐ It was here that the first real contact between black and white took place. For most of the time, an uneasy truce existed, interrupted by fairly violent contact which centred essentially around the land question. Whether this contact gave rise to or fanned the political consciousness of the Xhosa-speaking people is possibly debatable; What is beyond doubt is that they are politically more conscious than any other black ethnic group in South Africa.
- ☐ The powerful binding power of nationalism found a fertile ground in the fact that we have here a totally homogeneous black population – a people with the same language, culture, value structures and geographical ties, not dissimilar from the black industrial worker in the Natal area, but altogether different from that in Soweto, which is a cosmopolitan *pot-pourri*. These circumstances obviously favour solidarity on issues affecting the community and the successful espousal of slogans such as “an injury to one is an injury to all”.
- ☐ The Eastern Cape has the oldest, best

known and most respected black educational institutions – Healdtown, Lovedale and Fort Hare. Hardly a single black leader of note in Southern Africa today did not attend at least one of these institutions, while several among them were contemporaries there. (It is of interest that whenever critics refer to the so-called bush or tribal colleges, Fort Hare is never included in that appellation). Curiously, despite the existence of these institutions, there appears to have been a leadership vacuum in this area – either because the leadership settled elsewhere, for whatever reason, or because they were restricted in their mobility and locality by the government. Could this possibly have contributed to the occasional emergence of self-styled leaders who often championed a personal cause rather than a group or national one, and frequently caused considerable disruption?

- Housing in the Eastern Cape, generally, and in Port Elizabeth specifically, has suffered appalling neglect ever since Blacks first moved to the urban areas. Not only was the quality of housing of the lowest standard conceivable, but the shortage was allowed to become more acute with each birth that took place – so much so that the average number of occupants per house in Port Elizabeth's black townships today numbers six, with 31 per cent of homes being occupied by seven or more persons. In light of the current non-availability of building sites, this situation can only get worse over the next

two years.

- It is also possible that the Eastern Cape labour foment was added to by the preponderance of multi-national employers who are frequently, from the viewpoint of the individual observer, seen as either too soft to deal with such situations, too exploitative because they have no local interest, or too ignorant because they have insufficient local experience.

Against this background it is hardly surprising that the emergence of the new-style community-oriented, general worker type, "non-racial" black union took such powerful root in this area; or that still today schools are being boycotted and set alight in places as distant – literally if not figuratively – as Port Elizabeth and Cradock.

Occasionally it would appear that the neglect of schooling facilities is not necessarily the result of government action or policy, but perhaps also the result of the "tortoise mentality", if not material self-interest, among some unscrupulous people less devoted to a national cause than their own.

Be this as it may, the above are the peculiar factors, some less important than others, which have collectively resulted in the Eastern Cape becoming the crucible of labour unrest in South Africa.

It would seem from the above that the major differences and, therefore, probable reasons for the Eastern Cape being to the forefront in labour instability are mostly of a historical nature – they have been with us for many years, their influence has left their stamp on the socio-political situation; therefore, their effects – and they themselves – cannot be changed overnight.

Instant diagnosis and treatment have been tried often, but without lasting or much success. Let us recollect some of the new wisdoms that went with each bout of labour unrest – insufficient employer/employee communication; employers were accused of adopting an attitude of paternalism, of being insensitive to the needs and desires of their workers; our labour legislation was antiquated and needed revision; unions had to be recognised whether they were registered, representative, responsible, or not; workers were to be granted the right of participation in decision-making; job security had to be improved; a Code of Conduct had to be developed or adhered to; home ownership had to be attained; a black middle-class had to be developed.

At each time every one of these was regarded as the panacea, yet it did not work for long, if at all. There can be no doubt that, collectively, these remedies do contribute to greater stability. However, it is unrealistic to expect these remedies to represent a permanent solution; the situation cannot be that simple.

When South African industry first began to develop a social conscience, concurrent with a rise in the level and intensity of black demands, it believed that these simple formulae would provide all the answers.

Yet, relationships do not seem to have improved much. On the contrary, some unions appear to have grasped these

changes to strengthen their claims towards greater achievement throughout harassment of industry.

Additionally, black militancy and inter-union rivalries make themselves felt on the shop-floor at the expense of industry. Little wonder that employers are beginning to show signs of exasperation.

The confrontation approach adopted by organised – and unorganised – labour has on occasion served labour well. It is possible, however, that as confrontation has become a pattern rather than an ad hoc strategy, employers have become disillusioned with what they initially – perhaps naively yet sincerely – believed to be a mechanism to support accommodation, namely the black unions, and are now beginning to show signs of becoming less indulgent, if not more intolerant, towards them.

Employers have not only shown a remarkable degree of leniency during the past several years – leniency for which they should be commended because they always had it their way and were then suddenly and abruptly confronted by militant unions – they have also appeared to perform handstands to eradicate some of the wrongs of the past.

Quite naturally, the unions have pushed hard under these conditions, and equally naturally, employers are beginning to react differently.

This employer reaction should, therefore, not be interpreted as a move towards greater confrontation; it simply represents a very normal – and natural – swing of the pendulum in the other direction.

Nevertheless, our society is changing and change causes anxiety, particularly where gains by one segment are viewed as losses by another segment of the population. Therefore, what seems basic and essential is an attitudinal change on the part of both employers and unions.

Coupled with this change will have to go an effort towards reaching accommodation and establishing greater credibility – not the kind of credibility that sticks when things go your way and disappears when unpopular decisions are taken, but credibility in the real sense of the word.

However all social change is slow and often painful, and the necessary adjustments in South African labour relations

are unlikely to emerge except after years of patient accommodation.

In searching for a course of action to reach accommodation of, on the one hand, worker aspirations and, on the other, the legitimate desire to run a successful business in pursuit of profits in a given socio-political climate, I believe we should bear the following in mind:

Firstly, labour, or man-at-work, is of necessity also socio-political. Therefore, in addition to seeking economic and social improvements for its members, organised labour is, and will continue to be, politically inspired.

There are always political overtones to labour relations but nowhere more than in South Africa where the more general needs of the black community are completely intertwined with labour questions.

Nevertheless, so far, workers and unions have only on very rare occasions brought pure politics on to the shopfloor. Most demands that were deemed political have taken the form more of requests for employers to intervene on behalf of their employees to resolve socio-political issues and problems, such as raising the standard of living, the provision of housing and transport, and coping with influx control regulations.

Secondly, trade unions cannot and should not be regarded as partners or potential partners in the business enterprise, striving to attain mutual objectives; they are pressure groups serving their own particular needs and will continue to be so.

Against this background, let us consider some of the requirements that the three parties, namely, employers, labour and government, would have to meet in order to reach a reasonable accommodation:

Employers have experienced a fair degree of realism and will probably have to accommodate more of it. However, they must recognise the legitimate right of unions to exist and concede their freedom to operate independently. Employers should not endeavour to co-opt trade unions.

Employers should also cease to concern themselves with the political nature of trade unions.

In most major western countries the trade union movement is now a powerful politi-

cal and economic force, although they too were once considered conspirators against the established order. In South Africa the battle lines are still being drawn.

Finally, in accepting that their job may be more difficult than otherwise, employers should get down to the serious business of accommodating the basic and very necessary employer-employee conflict.

Unions need the opportunity to develop, free from harassment by employers and state agencies, to become efficient and powerful bodies committed to their task as a pressure group within a free market economy, rejecting the notion of overthrowing a system which, whatever its shortcomings, is capable of adapting to the needs of all those it serves.

In pursuit of this aim it should define for itself, the priorities, its basic objectives and the means to attain them.

The State should continue its *laissez faire* policy and keep out of labour relations, beyond providing a minimum of rules and structures. It should not become partisan in disputes between management and labour.

I believe that employers in the Eastern Cape have learnt much over the past few years and have had a fair amount of success in handling these labour problems and reaching an accommodation with forces that often appeared uncompromising.

On the other hand, labour has also learnt

some hard lessons and a greater degree of realism currently appears to prevail.

However, the longer term process towards reaching a mutually acceptable accommodation obviously is the task of all employers and worker groups, wherever they may be located.

Jointly we have the ability to achieve success, although, as our objectives will remain divergent, we must accept that we will always have a degree of conflict.

Perhaps, if the face-off between labour and employers was permitted by some elements of the media and other outside parties to remain an in-house affair, the process of accommodation could be less difficult.

The outcome of such face-offs could be fruitfully debated, commented and reported upon, instead of as at present, some parties either sensationalising circumstances beyond recognition, or acting as self-appointed mediators, delivering moralistic reports and judgments which often appear designed to precipitate unrest where it need not arise.

Finally, I do believe that goodwill and reason will yet prevail; I believe that all the elements of our society are beginning to realise their interdependence, the benefits of which is in direct proportion to the stability in which the society operates.

Hopefully, this will be the new message the Eastern Cape will begin to signal. ■

CSO: 3400/167

## STATE OF LABOR UNIONS EXAMINED

Johannesburg LEADERSHIP SA in English 1984-85 pp 89-91

[Article by Andrew Levy]

[Text]

In a sense it is easier to say what did not cause the emergence of the black union movement than what did. It was probably more the effect of Sharpeville, a growing perception of exploitation and the work of a young talented and dedicated group of white students who began to interest themselves in labour matters rather than either the Wiehahn Commission, or the so-called '73 Durban strikes. Irrespective of the debate of causality, it is sufficient to note that by 1976, the prerequisites for union growth existed.

The structure of the new South African unionism, or the "emergent unions" as they are more often called, is often confusing, and given the lack of a generally accepted theory of trade union growth and development it is sometimes difficult to make head or tail of the dynamism that currently typifies the union movement.

Perhaps it is more helpful, rather than to classify the union movement into the traditional categories of craft, industry and general unions, to examine the movement in terms of unions which have either "open" or "closed" recruiting strategies. In this sense, I hope to structure and classify the South African union movement, as it provides an easy insight into union behaviour, especially during periods of growth and development.

"Open" unions are those that do not limit their membership in a restrictive sense to jobs or categories of jobs, particularly on a skilled basis. In order to build up the greatest possible power base, they will recruit all and sundry. Inevitably, they are

found at the lower end of the skill spectrum, and hence require the numbers that the control of scarce skills cannot provide.

"Closed" unions on the other hand are restrictive in those whom they allow to join, utilise a power base more related to the monopoly of supply, and restrict their recruitment to specific jobs and their immediate surround. The history of the white trade union movement in South Africa, and the history of job reservation is the history of closed unionism. Attempts are made to exert control over entry to the job, and so provide protection from competition, dilution and wage cutting to the incumbents, as opposed to the control of job exit, in order to provide job security for those who do not have scarce skills to protect them in the employment situation. It is suggested that this is the way in which the current structure of the South African union movement, and in particular the genesis of black unionism, is best understood.

Diagram One (over the page) shows the current structure of the South African trade union movement by federation, the two on the left, the South African Confederation of Labour (Sacla) and the Trade Union Council of South Africa (Tucsa) being the "closed" unions, and the Independents, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu) and the Council of Unions of Southern Africa (Cusa) being the more "open" unions.

The open and closed idea clearly identifies in the South African context the political affiliations, and hence roughly indicates



the racial identity of the various unions. It also largely governs and explains the characteristic tactics and strategies of the various union groupings, which will be covered later.

Prior to discussing this however, it is first necessary to put into context internationally and nationally the relative size and racial composition of the South African union movement.

Diagram Two shows the relative density of the union movement in South Africa on an international basis. At 22 per cent of the economically active population, the penetration is low, but as will be argued later, the rate of growth is high. According to figures issued by the Department of Manpower, the density has more than doubled over the last two years, and the growth has come from the black unions. Diagram Three shows the racial composition of the movement as it currently is. The inference of the figures are obvious if the current pattern of growth holds true.

A number of characteristics can be identified which are typical of the early growth period of the black trade union movement, the first of which is perhaps the role of white expertise in the process of formation.

Many of the early unions and union confederations can directly trace their links back to workers' help, training and advice bureaux, set up, organised and largely driven by young white students. Groups such as the UTP, TUAC, and the Western Province Workers Advice Bureau gradually metamorphosed themselves into the unions of today. It is debatable if much organisation could have successfully or enduringly taken place without the expertise provided by white advisers whose involvement enabled them to survive a period of sustained employer hostility.

This involvement helped to mould the distinct difference in approach which marks the black union movement clearly from the white union movement.

Similarly, at the time that these groups were springing up, South Africa came under the focus of a sharp international spotlight, especially as far as its labour practices were concerned. The disinvestment debate heated up, and the counter argument of constructive engagement followed. As many companies fell under the successive influence of the various codes of employment practice, a liberalising wind

began to blow through the employer ranks in South Africa, albeit in a largely paternalistic vein. However it cannot be doubted that such loudly proclaimed standards of conduct provided a useful peg for the emergent union movement to hang its hat on.

Some would argue to that the Wiehahn Commission was instrumental in the new labour dispensation. Its instrumentality is less impressive than its political expediency, and to that extent it played a role as a facilitator of change in the slightly ironic sense that it removed the governmental skirt behind which the employer was wont to hide whenever the matter of labour relations was raised. It also had an undoubted effect as far as publicity is concerned, but ultimately probably delayed more activity from employers in the early days than it encouraged, being some four years behind promised delivery date. This hiatus encouraged and supported those employers whose natural tendency was to do nothing. They were by far the majority.

Another major shaping force in the early development of the black union movement was probably the inept response of both Government and employers. This, possibly more than any other single factor has been responsible for the shape, power base and ideology of the black union movement today.

In an attempt to divorce the union from its inherent power base, i.e. the members on the shop floor, employers rushed to introduce a shoddily thought-through legal enactment providing for Liaison Committees, and tried to limit collective bargaining via the Industrial Councils. The fact that both of these attempts were in violent contradiction with both the recruiting behaviour and the power base of an "open" union, as well as being contrary to the ideological dogma of "democratic unionism as an expression of the class struggle" was among the major factors that dominated the early disputes of 1979 to 1981. These factors sharpened the acuity and the divisions in the by now truly emerging union movement.

Current structure is a reflection of those early debates, and some of the sharpest differences between the various union groupings arose out of their response to issues such as registration and participation in Industrial Councils, and the efficacy of a power confrontation, as opposed

to the value of moral suasion when dealing with reluctant employers. The independent unions all refused (and many still do) to register. CUSA followed a policy of moral suasion, whilst FOSATU favoured organisation and a demand, often forcefully backed up, for the recognition of its unions.

Much action from the unions was then crude and unsophisticated, as was the employer response, with strikes, mass terminations, violence and police involvement being the norm, rather than any real understanding of what lay behind all this. A number of lessons were learnt in this period. The unions learnt the dangers of trying to take action when the organisational base was incomplete, and the employers learnt the futility of trying to strong-arm their way through a worker awareness that was becoming more complete and resolute.

These confrontations led to a culmination in 1982 of strike incidence of unprecedented levels, and a very real understanding by black workers themselves of the nature of union power and its place in the South African system, as they proved with the spate of pension strikes in 1981. And they marked the arrival, in a manner which was no longer doubtful, of the black trade union movement.

Up to this point, the history of the emerging unions was probably no different to any one of a number of previous historical experiences elsewhere. But from 1981 onwards, the movement began to be marked by increasingly more sophisticated stratagems. The movement owes much to individuals like Halton Cheadle for legal innovation, David Lewis for organising strategy, John Copelyn for organising tenacity and Sam Kikine for mercurial charisma. The movement was aware however, that one of the vital questions to be tackled in the future was the concentration of organising ability and experience in the hands of an invariably white few.

It had also become apparent that a continued state of internecine warfare would bleed the movement, and minimise its potential for impact. The ill-feelings, jealousies, ideological differences and competition for membership in the same industries and the same factories sharpened the movement's need to explore more seriously the need for some sort of unity. Also,

organisers and members, as the recession of 1982 began to take hold, realised that more subtle and sophisticated weapons were needed to continue the mobilisation of labour. It was this point which probably marked the arrival of the movement, and the end of the first broad period of emergence.

Amongst the factors that began to nudge the unions towards this more sophisticated period of consolidation was the turn in the economy and the creation of the Industrial Court, a body intended to settle labour matters on an equitable basis. These two features altered the tactics of the unions in a way which meant that the power confrontations could be avoided, and some far more subtle strategies utilised, via the very broad definition and concept of the unfair labour practise. In a declining economy, court action made a good deal more sense than strike action, as well as taking the burden of organisation and the risk of strike action away from the leadership and membership combined. Further, the possibility of a judicial precedent, even in an interior court, and a court of equity was a most attractive possibility. So the focus of the confrontation changed. Increasingly, legal challenge (based on a system of laws which had, ironically, been drawn up for the protection of an earlier group of workers – the first waves of Afrikaner urban drift) was being used to limit the employers' resistance to unionism and the idea of collective bargaining.

Further, the idea of unity was now being openly canvassed, and from 1980 onwards the subject was under regular discussion, with some ideological jump-shifts being made to enable the possibility to become a reality. After much backroom work, it was apparent by early 1982 that some form of co-operative and non-competitive union synergy was inevitable, albeit never likely to amount to anything other than a loosely knit confederation. The effect of this was, however, to grant an immediate ease to the inter-union warfare, as well as sharing the expertise available on a broader front.

However imperfectly, the lines structuring the South African labour movement had effectively been redrawn.

It is perfectly clear that the movement has fundamentally shifted in its balance towards the black spectrum. Given that this is the objective of the rapidly growing union movement, South Africa will soon

feel not only the strength of a strong collective union movement. Inevitably, the question of unionisation as a political force for change becomes perhaps the most significant problem our society faces.

Much of the unions' attention is now being directed towards these problems. In the same manner in which the early recognition agreements were used to create not only contractual rights for the union in the workplace, but also an acceptance of the concept of unionism and collective bargaining, so too are the current generation of agreements beginning to be more outward looking. And the shop steward, the pivotal pin in the function of any union, is becoming accepted in the wider society as an important personage.

At the same time it is now accepted that the time has come to phase out the movement's heavy reliance on white organisers. More of the executive and administrative roles are being filled by black union organisers, who have served the traditional apprenticeship for the organiser's role - shop floor activist - steward - union organiser. Some of these individuals are men of stature in every sense of the word, and generally have more experience of industrial relations than the managements with which they have to deal. That they tend to look at labour relations problems with a black man's perception of South African society is inevitable, and there is little doubt that black unionism and the "struggle" are one and the same. Any manager who has heard the singing of

freedom songs that inevitably accompany a strike will attest to this fact.

It has become trite to talk about the labour question in general terms in South Africa. Nor is it necessary to remind management, workers, politicians or the man in the street how vital it is in the equation of the future.

This paper confirms what has now become orthodox thought. What is not so orthodox nor apparent, is the solution. To date, if government has one it has not made it known. The vain hope of industrialists that unionism will not be political seems little more than hypocrisy as they espouse a system of politics which denies political rights to those who are turning increasingly to unions to provide them with those very rights that they are effectively denied.

The economics of industrialisation, growth and prosperity, coupled with the political requirements of stability and full employment, throw the area into sharp relief. The fact that as labour unionises it inevitably becomes more expensive relative to capital does nothing to give effect to the labour intensity which the economy requires and which the politicians need.

Labour relations was a subject which was unknown as a discipline to the man in the street 10 years ago, and untaught in our institutions.

We have since seen the light of day.

It is to be hoped that the awakening is not too late. ■

Diagram 1

**Union confederations**  
% of total S.A. union membership




Diagram 2

**Union density**  
% of economically active population





Diagram 3

**Racial composition**  
% of S.A. union membership by race



## EXPERT VIEWS BLACK URBANIZATION AS 'VITAL ISSUE'

Johannesburg LEADERSHIP SA in English 1984-85 pp 79-81

[Article by John Kane-Berman]

[Text]

**B**lack urbanisation is unquestionably one of the two or three most vital issues facing South Africa. The pass and influx control laws, which are designed to prevent it, have been criticised for decades by black people and liberal organisations. It is particularly encouraging to note that there is now growing questioning of influx control in the business world as well.

It was as recently as 1976, after the upheavals in Soweto and elsewhere, that at least one major business organisation recommended to the government that the pass laws should be retained. Many people in the business world no doubt still take this view, but it seems as if their number is diminishing as the economic costs of the pass laws are becoming increasingly apparent.

The government in the past 10 years has taken steps to remove barriers to the promotion of blacks into skilled jobs and their training for such jobs. However, as the International Monetary Fund, among others, has pointed out, the influx control system continues to act as a barrier preventing hundreds of thousands of black people from migrating from one part of the country to another to sell their labour in the best market.

And the recent government announcement that the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill is to be scrapped is greatly to be welcomed. If it presages a total re-think by the authorities of the influx control system, it will be one of the best developments we have seen in years.

But an element of caution is called for because the Department of Co-operation and Development is to draw up an Urbanisation Bill for presentation to the new tricameral parliament instead. Until the new bill is published we will have no means of being certain as to whether the scrapping of the Orderly Movement Bill signals a fundamental change of policy or is merely a tactical withdrawal in the face of the widespread condemnation it provoked. We need to be on our guard against name changes. After all, the Department of Native Affairs became the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, which became the Department of Plural Relations and Development, which became the Department of Co-operation and Development without any real change in its function or purpose.

The number of urban Blacks can confidently be expected to increase by something of the order of one million a year in the foreseeable future – a figure which the drought, with its devastating effects on agricultural employment in the "homelands" and "white" areas, can be expected to push even higher. Although the Soweto upheavals caused a great deal more attention to be paid to Africans' living conditions and the housing backlog in the townships in the "white" areas, there is as yet no sign that the authorities are developing a policy to cater for the influx of new urban residents that can be expected to these areas. Housing on 99-year leases is thus still subject to the pass laws because only people with urban residence and employment rights under Section 10 of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act



are eligible for such housing. Official African housing waiting-lists do not include the names of people who do not possess these qualifications. Even in a township like Soshanguve, which borders on Bophuthatswana north-west of Pretoria, housing is effectively limited to people with such rights. One consequence of the policy of tying housing to influx control is the growth of large shanty towns around some of South Africa's major cities.

To a large extent, the huge African housing backlog in the "white" areas is the result of influx control. In the late Sixties a number of local authorities, among them Johannesburg and Pretoria, applied for land in order to expand the black townships under their jurisdiction and so provide the extra housing that population growth required. Instead, the government imposed a freeze on the construction of new African housing in many "white" urban areas in the hopes of diverting Africans from the "white" areas to the "homelands". Although this freeze has been relaxed in some places, 10 precious years have been lost in the meantime. As a result, not only is the backlog much greater than it might otherwise have been, but a decade of double-digit inflation has made the cost of eliminating it astronomically high. Just as the economy is now paying the price of the wrong-headed education policies imposed by Dr Verwoerd, so are we now paying the price of housing policies based on a philosophy of pass laws first and housing second.

In attempting to justify the continued enforcement of influx control the authorities raise the spectre of overcrowding of amenities in the "white" metropolitan areas. Township housing is indeed notoriously overcrowded, while there are also severe shortages of schools, teachers, hospitals, and other facilities. But there is every reason to believe that the backlogs in the "homelands" are greater. While the African housing shortage in the "white" metropolitan areas has been estimated at 160 000, the backlog in the "homelands" is already of the order of 230 000. Schools, hospitals, and other facilities in the homelands are grossly inadequate.

Moreover, while the authorities express the fear that slums will develop in the "white" urban areas if there is no influx control, we need to remember that there are already vast concentrations of people in the homelands living in so-called "closer settlements". According to Charles Simkins, a labour economist at the University of Cape Town, in 1980 there were some 3 700 000 people living

in the "homelands" in such settlements, which he referred to as "areas where people live at urban densities without access to arable or grazing land but which are not proclaimed urban areas." Others have described some of these "closer settlements" as "giant rural slums". According to Simkins, about one third of the homeland population in

1980 was living in such settlements, which 20 years ago were virtually non-existent. If there is "over-concentration" of population in South Africa, this is surely where it is. Influx control and mass population removals do not avoid over-concentration; their effect is to shift the problem from the "white" areas to the "homelands". If the "closer settlements" grew from virtually

nothing in 1960 to a population of 3 700 000 in 1980, what is the figure likely to be in 1990 or 2000 AD if removals and tighter influx control continue to put more and more people on to land where there is no room for them?

The government's revitalised industrial decentralisation and deconcentration package is attracting more interest than earlier versions of this policy, but the question needs to be asked whether South Africa can afford such policies. Even if deconcentration can be made attractive to investors through wage and other subsidies, the costs of such subsidies still have to be borne by the economy as a whole. Thus in the last nine months of 1983 the Decentralisation Board approved more than 1 000 applications for decentralisation benefit, but the cost of such benefits was R169 million.

It is surely irrational for South Africa, with its high rate of structural employment, to pursue policies that push up the costs of job creation, as decentralisation does, or, worse still, inhibit the creation of jobs. Academic researchers have, from time to time, attempted to quantify the direct costs of influx control, among them the cost of using police and other officials to enforce it and the cost of building and staffing enough prisons to accommodate technical offenders. But the opportunity costs must be immeasurable. They include lost earnings for people who might otherwise have been in gainful employment and lost economic growth. According to the Corporation for Economic Development some 150 000 jobs were created in border areas and the "homelands" through the government's decentralisation programme over the last 20 years.

Measured against the official estimate that at least 130 000 homeland work-seekers enter the labour market each year, this is a miniscule achievement. It is reduced to virtually nothing if one bears in mind the effects of the Physical Planning Act, in terms of which the government has the power to refuse investors permission to extend or open factories if so doing would cause the number of Africans in employment in such factories to exceed an official quota. Thus between January 1968, when the Physical Planning Act came into force, and January 1976, 92 000 potential jobs went unfilled in major metropolitan areas because of refusals in terms of the racial

quota. This was greater than the 82 000 jobs created by decentralisation over the same period. Decentralisation is a politically inspired policy in the first place, and any jobs resulting from it must be offset against jobs lost in the metropolitan areas through the Physical Planning Act or other influx control-related laws. If this is done, the already modest claims made for the success of decentralisation policies in creating jobs must become modest to the point of disappearance.

Influx control also causes misallocation of scarce resources. In August last year the Minister of Transport Affairs officially opened a new R134-million railway system between Mabopane and Soshanguve (formerly known as Mabopane East) on the border of Bophuthatswana, and Pretoria. The railway can carry 60 000 commuters. This particular development is in accordance with the government's policy of relocating residents of certain black townships into the "homelands" or border areas. It appears that a great many of the passengers who will be using the new railway are people who would otherwise have lived closer to work in the extensions to Pretoria's black townships that the city's Non-European Affairs Department wanted in the late Sixties. The cost of prohibiting new housing development in these and other townships then is reflected not only in the public money that has now had to be spent on building the new railway and the enormous new station at its Mabopane/Soshanguve terminus, but in the additional costs that workers and their employers and therefore ultimately consumers will have to bear as a result of the greater distances between the workers' homes and their places of employment.

A similar situation will no doubt obtain if the government carries out its intention of shifting the settled residents of Langa, Nyanga, and Guguletu to Khayelitsha, 40km from Cape Town. To these costs must of course be added the unquantifiable costs of damage to race relations caused by a policy which compels black people to live far out of town. We have already seen in the lengthy bus boycott in the Ciskei that the long commuting distances and increased transport costs entailed in this policy can become highly-charged political issues. In the case of Soshanguve, the Pretoria Chamber of Commerce has already warned the government that it is courting certain labour unrest and probably disaster if it persists

with its plan to withdraw buses from the Pretoria-Soshanguve Mabopane run in order to compel commuters to use the new rail service instead. Similarly, the Afrikaanse Sakekamer in Cape Town has warned of the possible negative political effects of the Khayelitsha proposals.

Many observers find the government's approach to the presence of black people in the so-called "white" areas rather confusing. Unless the Urbanisation Bill currently in preparation changes things radically, the policy is best understood by reference to the report of the Riekert Commission of Inquiry into legislation affecting the utilisation of manpower. Published in 1979 only a week after the Wiehahn Report on industrial relations, the Riekert Report, whose key recommendations were accepted in a white paper, was a comprehensive blueprint of influx control policy for the future. In essence, what Dr Piet Riekert, a former economic adviser to the Prime Minister, recommended in his report was the division of the African population into two groups – those with official permission to live and work in the "white" areas on a continuous basis and those without.

The former – urban "insiders" – appear to number about one in four adult blacks. These "insiders" are already benefiting from the introduction of the 99-year lease system, township electrification and other improvements in urban amenities, and certain relaxations in the pass laws which enable them to change jobs more freely.

Obviously no-one can criticise these "insiders" if their position improves, but the Riekert Report is a double-edged sword because the price of the privileges now afforded the urban "insiders" is being paid by "outsiders" who do not have the pass qualifications enabling them to live and work continuously in the urban areas. Their position is becoming steadily worse as they are squeezed between the economic recession and the stricter influx control that was imposed even before the Orderly Movement Bill was introduced. Employers in the urban areas are required to satisfy the labour bureau that no "insider" labour is available before they can hire people from among the "outsiders". As long as restrictions like these are in force, blacks are unlikely to be impressed with assertions that South Africa believes in free-market principles.

Again it must be emphasised that the scrapping of the Orderly Movement Bill gives no grounds for complacency. Indeed the passing during the current parliamentary session of the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act necessitates increased vigilance. What this measure means is that all those 7 800 000 Africans who were denationalised and thus became statutory foreigners when the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and the Ciskei became nationally independent states, will have their presence in the "white" areas regulated by the legislation that would apply to Russians or Malawians or any other genuine foreigners in South Africa.

In the last two or three years the government has vested many officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development with the powers of passport control officers, so enabling them to use alien laws instead of the traditional pass system to enforce influx control against Africans officially regarded as belonging to the "independent" homelands. The argument that the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act is colour-blind – the government has said that it will apply equally to citizens of Greece and of Bophuthatswana – is no answer to the objections to the bill. Citizens of Greece are not clamouring for jobs in South Africa nor do they have any claim on them. Black people in the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and the Ciskei do want such jobs and they do have a claim on them.

Private sector lobbying against it is almost certainly one of the main reasons for the scrapping of the Orderly Movement Bill. So far so good. This success should now be built on. Has the time not come for concerted action by the business world to press the government to adopt a much more rational and humane black urbanisation policy? Such a policy would have to be based on a number of fundamental principles:

- ☐ The right of all South Africans, irrespective of race or colour, including South Africans who have been stripped of their citizenship through the "homelands" independence policy, to sell their labour freely where best they can.
- ☐ The need to maximise job creation at the lowest possible cost to the economy.
- ☐ Recognition that South Africa's capital resources are scarce and need to be de-

ployed in productive ways rather than in costly and unnecessary transport schemes.

- ☐ Recognition that the homelands are seriously overcrowded and would benefit if people no longer able to make a living in subsistence agriculture there were able to leave the land in search of employment in the modern sector.
- ☐ Recognition that it is simply not possible in the long run to keep trying to dam up people in the "homelands" behind ever-tightening influx controls and aliens laws. The Hoexter Commission has already drawn attention to the fact that South Africa's prisons are "full to overflowing" as a result of influx control. "The prisons are crammed with thousands of breadwinners who have landed there for minor technical offences," the commission said. One shudders to think what kind of situation a Hoexter Commission ten years hence is likely to find if influx control continues to be enforced.
- ☐ Recognition of the fact that no urbanisation policy can succeed if it fails to take into account the conditions in the "homelands" that cause people to leave them in the first place to seek their fortunes in the metropolitan areas.
- ☐ The need to enable urban local authorities to plan and budget realistically in respect of urban population growth and its demands upon housing and urban infrastructure.
- ☐ The need to enable education authorities also to plan and budget realistically for the provision of schooling.
- ☐ Recognition that urbanisation is a pre-condition of economic growth.

It is, of course, impossible to predict what the rate of urbanisation would be if influx control were lifted. But it will be lower than is sometimes supposed, because there are hundreds of thousands of black people already living in the metropolitan areas in defiance of the pass laws. The number in fact is probably well over a million. In their cases, lifting influx control would mean simply legalising their position. Many of them are "squatting" in camps

such as those in Cape Town or shacks erected in backyards in Katlehong and elsewhere. They have shown themselves resourceful enough to build their own houses. Many of them are already in employment and could pay rent for their sites. In the short term, they could continue to live in self-erected housing, with refuse removal and other municipal services laid on. In due course, land could be made available and they could be provided with or provide themselves with more orthodox housing.

In addition, hundreds of thousands of the black people in the metropolitan areas are migrant workers in full-time employment. Lifting influx control in their case would mean that those who wish to bring their families to join them would be permitted to do so. Many of the occupants of urban "squatter" camps are in fact migrants who have moved out of hostels and compounds in order to live with their families, whom they have brought to town. They, too, could be eligible for housing on the same basis as present urban "insiders". Such families already have a source of income from their breadwinners.

Of course, the lifting of influx control would have to be accompanied by other policies, notably the removal of all restrictions on black businessmen, including the restrictions preventing their establishing enterprises in urban central business districts. Such businessmen would have ready-made consumers on their doorsteps and they would, in due course, make a contribution to reducing employment and to economic growth in general.

The last point that needs to be made is that, when all is said and done, South Africa really has no choice but to accept that black urbanisation is going to occur on an increasing scale whether prevailing ideology likes it or not. The sensible thing to do is to accept this reality now and start planning accordingly rather than to pretend it can be staved off indefinitely. The result of delay will be not only gravely damaged race relations but even more massive backlogs in urban infrastructure than we have already. ■



KOORNHOFF ON IMPACT OF INFLUX CONTROL

Johannesburg LEADERSHIP SA in English 1984-85 pp 51-52

[Interview with Dr Piet Koornhof, minister of co-operation and development by Tony Koenderman]

[Text]

**Koenderman:** One of the issues which affects SA's human resources is the question of urbanisation and influx control. Many people would say that the process of urbanisation is inevitable and even desirable, but government policy over the years has tried to control or restrict it. Could you explain the thinking behind that?

**Koornhof:** Yes, I think it is today accepted that urbanisation is a phenomenon which is there, which you have got to accept and which is accepted. And it has obviously many good aspects to it. But that doesn't mean to say that you can't deal with the phenomenon of urbanisation in such a way that you obtain maximum benefits and do away with (as far as is humanly possible) some of the very bad aspects, like overcrowding, squalor and squatting. That is why urbanisation is something that has to be studied carefully. The more comprehensive the studies you have at your disposal, the better the policies you can formulate to maintain order and to make the best out of urbanisation in order to improve the quality of life.

**Koenderman:** What is the official position on influx control?

**Koornhof:** The official position is that you must have legal control. I am dealing with the third bill that has been called the "Orderly Movement and Settlement Bill" but the decision has been that this bill be scrapped completely and a new bill with a new name be produced and presented. In my search to find the answers to some of the basic questions which have cropped up, we've not managed to arrive at some-

thing tangible that I can present. I have decided that unless I can achieve something like I did with the Local Government Bill which can withstand the test of time, I won't proceed with it. I made it quite clear four years ago that I have declared war on the *dompas* (black reference book), that we must get out of this technical offence system and we must find new ways and means of dealing with this question of urbanisation.

But within the framework of what is government policy the fact of the matter is influx control is being implemented in a very benevolent way. But it is at the moment, and this is very important, the subject of in-depth scrutiny by the government. A cabinet committee has been set up to deal with black affairs outside of the national states. Through that mechanism we will now look at this question of urbanisation and the formulation of a proper urbanisation survey in the closest collaboration with the black leaders. That is, in my humble view, a tremendous victory for sound thinking.

**Koenderman:** Doesn't the government's commitment to free market principles, which imply labour mobility, conflict with influx control?

**Koornhof:** The objective in a free market system is that you have maximum mobility of labour but with the maintenance of proper order. If you have the one without the other then both will just disappear and it will create a very bad situation. I will go further and say that if we in this country cannot arrive at a solution to the question



of mobility of labour, this one thing will create very serious problems for us in the years ahead. We must resolve this and I think we are on the way to resolving it. But it is not so easy. The first pass laws were enacted in this country two centuries ago, and you can't undo an established system like that at the drop of a hat. Success often lies in not pushing change too fast, because then you put the clock back.

**Koenderman:** One aspect of the migration pressure is obviously economic. It would seem as though these pressures are actually increasing rather than anything else – that the disparities in rural and urban wages are getting greater?

**Koornhof:** It is obviously true you have economic pressures, that is not new. The same has happened in Great Britain, France, all the western countries. But one must not fall into the trap of thinking that one cannot do anything about it in a way that will benefit the country. A policy of deconcentration could promote secondary urban centres, rather like Britain has done. When they saw a big influx into London, they encouraged development in Birmingham, Leeds and other cities.

If you look at what has been achieved through development in our national states, you will see it is not negligible. In the last 18 months, when the economy has been depressed, R800 million has been invested in the national states by 800 industries, resulting in the creation of 80 000 jobs – in round terms.

There is a tendency to run the national states down, but they should not be underestimated. They have made a valuable contribution towards what should be the normal targets of any civilised country.

If you create jobs in the Eastern Cape instead of on the Witwatersrand, what on earth can be wrong with that? You must go for deconcentration and decentralisation because you save in the end. You save not only money but lives, and also obviate squatting in the best way possible.

In addition, there is quite an urbanisation process going on in the deconcentration areas and in the national states.

Of course, I am at this stage not talking only of national states, but also the eight economic development regions.

**Koenderman:** Yes, but it is conceivable that there might have been more jobs created in

#### **urban areas.**

**Koornhof:** Even if that was the case, your problem would have been compounded. You see it is a very complicated issue. Somebody said this morning that some people want all the development here in Cape Town and Johannesburg and then salve their consciences by dishing out blankets to the poor during winter time. But that is the surest way of running into difficulties and problems.

**Koenderman:** Looking at that whole package of deconcentration, as it is called, is the government satisfied with the progress it has made?

**Koornhof:** Well, you can never be satisfied but let's say the government is heartened by the response that the incentives have drawn.

**Koenderman:** So the government is irreversibly committed to this policy of the national states on the one hand and general deconcentration on the other hand?

**Koornhof:** I see no other solution. We are still talking about urbanisation. I see no other solution myself than to try and make it as easy as possible if your targets are still to be: Upliftment of people; improvement of quality of life; maintenance of order and happiness for the maximum number of people.

**Koenderman:** There are a couple of problems with it that appear to be insuperable, such as the lack of economic viability of some of the national states.

**Koornhof:** That's true. I don't argue against that. But even if they are not viable, they are still not wrong. Why are they wrong? If the Russians take over here tomorrow, the one thing they will have to face is that they will not be able to do away with the national states, for the simple reason that the tribal groups in each state want their independence from other tribal groups.

**Koenderman:** Are you suggesting that perhaps they should be looked upon as regional governments?

**Koornhof:** I am not suggesting that but what I am saying is just look at national states as being a sound regional government and then tell me that you still think that it is nonsense. So you are dealing with something fundamental which is not by nature bad. You get big and small ones. You get wealthy and less wealthy ones,

surely? This is not peculiar to South Africa. If you go to America you will find exactly the same thing. Iowa is a very small state and California is a big state. Yet there is a place for both.

**Koenderman:** A changed attitude, for example, towards home ownership for Blacks in the urban areas, suggests that the government vision of the future of urban Blacks is substantially different from what it was?

**Koornhof:** Well, the Blacks outside of the national states have been accepted as part of the set up. That's a very important acceptance in my view. Now, I think it just stands to reason that you are now going to have a quickened urbanisation process among Blacks in this country. I think one must accept it. If we are successful in our policy of deconcentration, and urbanisation in deconcentrated areas, and I see no reason why we won't be successful, we will find peaceful solutions to some of the world's most vexed problems all concentrated in one area – in the southern part of Africa. And I say this country has got the capability of becoming a miracle on its own in this century if these things can be done successfully.

**Koenderman:** For some time now it has been accepted that Section Three of the Physical Planning Act should be altered or perhaps abolished completely. This was

recommended by the Riekert Commission but nothing has been done about it. Is it still the intention to change it?

**Koornhof:** Yes, I think so. But that is connected with a few other things which are in the process of being attended to.

**Koenderman:** What role is there for the business or private sector in the process of reform? Has it played a useful and constructive role up until now?

**Koornhof:** I will give you my thinking on that. I consider the strength generated in this country by the private sector and government sector in finding each other as one of the greatest things that has happened in my life. I refer in particular to the Carlton Conference and then the Good Hope Conference. That strength, I have said, is unparalleled and it is a strength so great that I can't see anything that can really destroy it.

**Koenderman:** What about black entrepreneurs? There are a large number of laws and regulations which restrict their activities in one way or another. Is the Government committed to eliminating restrictions of that kind?

**Koornhof:** I try to remove all those restrictions as far as that is concerned, where I can. If there are still any problems I am trying to eliminate them. I make no bones about it, I say it openly. □

SECRETARY GENERAL OF BISHOPS' CONFERENCE SPEAKS OUT

Verona NIGRIZIA in Italian Oct 84 pp 48-50

[Interview with Father S. Mkhathshwa: "Voices of Hope in the Dark of the Night"]

[Text] During a visit in Rome last July, Father S. Mkhathshwa, secretary general of the South African Bishops' Conference, reviewed for NIGRIZIA the present position of the Catholic Church in his country.

[Question] Do you believe that the South African Bishops' Conference is responding to the dramatic situation of the Catholic Church in your country?

[Answer] First of all, let me say that between 1952, the year Bishops' Conference was instituted, and 1976, we saw a slow but sure evolution. The bishops' attitude toward South African reality could be defined as "liberal" in that we viewed the problem in terms of racism and "paternalism" because we felt that if the ruling class sincerely wanted to improve social conditions, this would have been enough.

The year 1977 marked a decisive turning point for the South African episcopate: the church came to terms with the oppressed. The bishops realized that apartheid was not merely a matter of racial discrimination but also one of unjust political and economic structures. This change of heart within the episcopate hierarchy I would define as "revolutionary."

[Question] What motivated the change?

[Answer] There could never be a single motive for such a decisive turning point. I believe, however, that the 1976 uprisings in Soweto and other black ghettos came as a shock to the church leaders.

[Question] Are there any outstanding leaders in the Bishops' Conference and, if so, who are they?

[Answer] That is difficult to say. I think, however, that when the conference arrives at a decision, all members fully subscribe to it. Some are more outspoken than others, like Archbishop Hurley of Durban, president of the conference, like Archbishop Fitzgerald of Johannesburg (now retired for reasons of health) and Mandlenkosi Zwane, who died in 1980. These are the best-known

leaders if only because they have been the most reported by the mass media, but that does not necessarily mean that they are the most important.

[Question] Monsignor Hurley, currently president of the Bishops' Conference, has become something of a symbol of the Catholic Church's opposition to apartheid. What is your government's attitude toward him?

[Answer] There is an attempt by the South African government to "isolate" Archbishop Hurley by insisting that he speaks only for himself, not for the Catholic Church in South Africa. The government makes every effort to depict him as a "radical" and pseudopolitician. But there are also some Catholics--for example, members of the League for the Defense of Catholicism--who consider Hurley a cryptocommunist, who fraternizes with terrorists. The government is doing its utmost to discredit him.

[Question] It is said that the premature death of Monsignor Mandlenkosi, Bishop of Manzini in Swaziland, broke the link between the episcopate and the most radical sector of the black world.

[Answer] No, I don't think so. It is true that Bishop Zwane kept in close contact with the most radical black elements and spoke their language. Zwane's ideas made a powerful impact on the more progressive black circles. But I don't think one can say that the conference is deaf to the most progressive voices today.

[Question] What is the relationship between the Catholic Church and the most militant black elements, such as the black consciousness movement? Are the committed black movements allowed membership in the Catholic Church?

[Answer] The church perceives them as "signs of the times," but we have never taken any official position on them. During the 1970s, the black consciousness movement played a significant role in helping the blacks to become aware of their dignity and to take pride in themselves. But we must go beyond that. Indeed, the South African problem is not only racial, it is also a question of class. We must pay close attention to our economic infrastructures and understand the influence they exert. Therefore, we believe that while the black consciousness movement has a mission to perform, it does not meet present conditions adequately.

Moreover, black theology, which is allied with the black consciousness movement, is moving toward a "contextualized" theology.

[Question] The Protestant churches are participating with the Ecumenical Council of South African Churches (CSAC). What does the council do and what does it think of the conclusions drawn by the government inquiry commission, headed by Eloff, on CSAC finances?

[Answer] The CSAC has done an excellent work. As for the Eloff commission, as you know, the accusations it levelled against CSAC focused on finances (misuse of funds, etc.), yet the commission spent only one day on its finances but entire weeks on analyzing CSAC ideology, theology and thought. I am convinced

that the Eloff commission had nothing to do with CSAC's finances, only with its sociopolitical activities and methods.

[Question] What is your opinion of Desmond Tutu, secretary general of CSAC?

[Answer] Sometimes I have some reservations about what he, an Anglican bishop, says and does. But on the whole, we must acknowledge that Bishop Tutu is performing a prophetic function for the country.

[Question] Do his close ties with the black consciousness movement help or hinder his work?

[Answer] The black consciousness movement counts Tutu as one of its leaders, but Tutu also maintains excellent relations with the more progressive groups. In general, however, he seems to be more at home with black consciousness than any other faction.

[Question] How do you see the work of Steve Biko, the movement's founder (strangled in prison by the South African police in 1977)?

[Answer] Biko was very critical of the role played by the church, yet he was very close to ecclesiastical circles. In fact, his best friends were prelates. His achievements were highly significant because he spurred the church to see South Africa in a new light. But we incline to forget one thing (I can say this because he was a friend of mine and I knew him well): he was undergoing a profound ideological conversion when he died. Not that he rejected his beliefs, certainly; instead, he was going beyond the principles of black consciousness toward a more open ideology. Today Biko would have felt more comfortable with the progressive groups than with the followers of black consciousness.

[Question] Another outstanding church figure is Pastor Allan Boesak. What can you tell us about him?

[Answer] Boesak, who is president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and chaplain for university students, is a young man with enormous potential. If he continues what he is doing, particularly with his analyses of South African society in relation to the gospel, he will become one of South Africa's foremost ecclesiastic leaders.

[Question] Do you believe that anything is changing in white pro-apartheid religious circles?

[Answer] Yes, but only in a typically intellectual and doctrinal sense. My impression is that ordinary Christians have not changed. If there are any changes, they are evolving at a very slow pace and not very visibly. The fact that our people pray in racially segregated congregations (when a black man goes to pray in a Boer church, what an uproar that causes!) means that something is radically wrong.

[Question] In that context, is Beyers Naude, the Boer pastor of the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK), exiled in 1977 by the Pretoria regime, really an exception?



[Answer] Yes. His was a voice in the desert. His own church rejected him on the charge that he betrayed his own people, the "white tribe," with his views. Yet it is interesting to note how favorably young Boer pastors regard him even though they do not say so openly. Beyers Naude is a great and extraordinary Christian.

[Question] Do the independent churches, which are proliferating in South Africa (over 3,000), concern themselves with the question of justice?

[Answer] Not at all. They are completely absorbed with their liturgical rites, their otherworldly activities and their intraecclesiastical disputes.

[Question] In the missionary field, there has been a good deal of discussion about the Dominican Albert Nolan. What do you think of him?

[Answer] God sent Nolan to us. He is doing a fabulous job, not only in theology (a translation of Nolan's book "Jesus Before Christianity" will soon be published in Italy: editor's note) but also in increasing consciousness through a more progressive methodology for understanding reality. It is very significant that notwithstanding his radicalism, bishops, religious persons and Christian communities listen to what he has to say. Nolan is a lucid, dedicated thinker; today he is filling a very urgent need in South Africa.

His lifestyle is a living testimony to the gospel. In 1976, when he was elected church provincial of the South African Dominicans, he sold his home in a wealthy white suburb of Johannesburg to go and live among black laborers in Mayfair Station. His close contacts with the blacks--students, workers, unionists--gave him a deeper understanding of their reality and encouraged him to dedicate himself to the cause of justice.

[Question] Does he have any followers?

[Answer] Yes, some. Experiments are now being conducted with the marginalized and the disenfranchised in Johannesburg and Soweto. Let me remind you of Sister Bernard, the black South African nun, accused of keeping documents of the African National Congress (ANC) and sentenced to 4 months in jail. The Bishops' Conference intervened and appealed to a higher court. We are awaiting a new trial.

[Question] Then there are rays of hope in the darkness?

[Answer] Yes. If there weren't, not even I would be able to carry on; but I am heartened by these signs. However small and poor they may be, they are still an incentive to go forward.

[Insert] Who is he?

Father Smangalis Mkhathshwa, secretary general of the South African Bishops' Conference, first came to international attention 30 October 1983, when he was arrested at Fort Hare in the Ciskei, one of South Africa's puppet states, while

he was conducting a prayer meeting of the Christian Students' Movement. He then vanished despite protests from South African bishops and international organizations.

Not until last 20 January was he formally indicted for terrorism. On 20 February he appeared in court. On 9 March, his trial was suspended for lack of proof. (The true reason, however, was another: the main witness confessed to the judge that he had been compelled under torture to bear false witness against the accused.)

Before this episode, which was widely reported by the international press, Mkhathshwa was already well known in South Africa for his political views, his dedication and his commitment to the welfare of the nation's more than 20 million blacks. He had previously been imprisoned in August 1976, and held in confinement until the following December. In June 1977, the government sentenced him to 5 years in exile, dubbed "civil death" for undesirables in that paradise of whites. In October 1977, he was returned to jail and held without trial until the following March. While he was still in exile, the bishops of South Africa, led by Monsignor D.F. Hurley, archbishop of Durban, elected him secretary general of the South African Bishops' Conference. This constituted a challenge to the regime in Pretoria, which now sees the conference as a threat to its power. Over the past several years, the Catholic bishops have incensed the government by intensifying their actions, including a report on Namibia (banned in South Africa), Archbishop Hurley's collection of photographs showing massacres and, last year, the bishops' denunciation of Pretoria's constitutional reforms. Observers interpret Father Mkhathshwa's most recent arrest and detention as a warning to the nation's Catholic bishops and to Hurley himself.

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CSO: 3428/2

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE, ROLE OF MEDIA EMPHASIZED

Dar es Salaam MZALENDU in Swahili 9 Sep 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Our Views"]

[Text] In all countries of the world, news media are essential components of the community. Such media are newspapers, radio and television which provide people with information. At the same time, such media also provide news for the government. This is an important activity since it informs people about events occurring in the country, and it also informs the government about citizens' thoughts on various matters.

In addition to providing news, the media help greatly in instructing the citizens. For this purpose, newspapers, radio and television provide instruction for the citizenry on various things related to good living, things to avoid in life, and many educational subjects. In general, news media help to teach new and old things useful for the citizenry.

Another job of the news media is to entertain. For example, in the media people are entertained with music, sports, photographs, stories, puzzles and articles on various events. These are examples of a few of the entertainments which can be provided by various news media.

In accomplishing all these objectives, the media get a lot of news by using reporters. Their main job is to gather news stories as they occur--both good and bad; to interview people and leaders about such news to discover the truth; to discover the veracity of the news from those involved; and in general to ensure that the news they publish is true, fresh and of significance to society.

Fortunately in our country news reporters have tried to fulfill their responsibilities whenever possible. Obviously in doing so they have faced problems of job-related materials shortages. Moreover, in addition to the considerable praise they have already received, the reporters realize that they have a great opportunity to do better.

On the other hand, news reporters are unable to fulfill their responsibilities better as a result of obstacles they encounter on the part of certain party leaders. Sometimes when searching for news or following up on it, the

reporters have been denied news important to the nation and the public. Similarly sometimes reporters have been given only partial news and were thus prevented from ferreting out the actual truth.

The prime minister, Salim Ahmed Salim, asked all concerned to avoid the practice of withholding information from reporters through different subterfuges. The other day when he addressed the third assembly of the Dar es Salaam news reporters school, he said reporters have the right to obtain any news about the people's development.

Moreover, the prime minister said that the practice of some party leaders of holding back information from reporters through various subterfuges will make the nation's citizens in general fail to understand the real state of our problems and successes, and thus provides our adversaries a chance to spread reports which are untrue.

It is our hope that the point of view of the prime minister has been understood, especially by party leaders exhibiting this behavior. We realize that those exhibiting this conduct are few, but even so they are hindering the important job of informing the public about the successes and problems of the entire nation.

We believe that if there is close cooperation among reporters, news publishers and the people in general, the great task of constructing our nation in all sectors will be easier because we will all know and understand where we are coming from, where we are going and where we are faltering.

12721

CSO: 3449/1

ROLE OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ASSESSED

Dar es Salaam UHURU in Swahili 6 Sep 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Our Views"]

[Text] Thursday, 6 Sep 1984--Whenever reports are published depicting international economic conditions, the picture that emerges for a developing country is not encouraging. Almost a decade ago, a World Bank report predicted stagnation in economic development in developing countries for another decade.

That report pointed out that developing countries would face a shortage of foreign exchange, higher prices for goods purchased from industrial countries, higher energy costs, especially oil, lower prices for goods produced by developing countries, and in general currency devaluation and a worsening world economy.

That is in fact the way things stand now. Prolonged poor economic conditions have adversely affected the world and hurt developing countries even more. Even after those countries were so heavily impacted, other natural disasters increasingly overwhelmed them. Poor weather conditions, drought, floods, storms, and human, animal and plant diseases continue to add to the problems of the developing countries.

Along with all of these occurrences, the economy continues to worsen. The 20th-anniversary report of the African Development Bank [ADB], published recently in the city of Abidjan, Ivory Coast, pointed out that more than half of the member countries of that bank will continue to confront poor economic conditions and there are no prospects for improvement in the short term.

The bank made clear in its report that the good economy we were favored with in the 1960's and the early 1970's has collapsed and plummeted in the past 5-7 years. This has resulted from poor international economic conditions, drought, the population increase and lower farm crop yields. All these things have caused the average income of people in such countries to continue to decline every year.



Tanzania is one of those African countries and it too has been affected. The people realize how those problems are disrupting our endeavors for the living standards and the development of our nation. In a situation like this, we realize that we will be able to extricate ourselves from a poor economy by increasing our work effort as well as agriculture, the real basis of our development.

Besides, our nation continues to stress cooperation among developing countries in various forms as one means of extricating themselves from economic difficulties, exploitation by capitalist countries in our commercial exchanges, and establishing a common position and fighting harder for a new legal international economic order. In summary, common self-reliance among the poor countries is a true support in the effort of developing countries to achieve economic liberation.

Moreover, financial institutions in Africa must stress the importance of self-reliance especially in food by providing greater opportunities for the development of agriculture on this continent. A fine example is contained in the ADB report, pointing out that its policy of providing loans to member countries has given greater priority to agricultural development and other projects with a greater focus on food production. The bank has allocated 124 billion shillings for various loans over the coming year.

We hope that this policy will be properly implemented, that member countries will be able to increase prosperity by improving agriculture in their countries and thus establish a good strong basis for self-reliance. If Africa succeeds in doing this, as well as continuing efforts to improve cooperation among those countries in general, our country's economy will change and improve.

12721

CSO: 3449/1

IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED RAIL SERVICE FOR COUNTRY STRESSED

Dar es Salaam UHURU in Swahili 12 Sep 84 p 7

[Article by Madanga S. Madanga: "The Tanzania Railway Corporation [TRC] Is Trying To Provide Excellent Service"]

[Text] Despite the many problems which are confronting our parastatal organizations, efforts are being made to try to provide excellent and reliable service. Recently the TRC obtained aid in stone crushing equipment and railway cars for spreading stones with the help of the Development Corporation of Canada (CIDA). In this article our correspondent who toured the quarries explains the TRC's effort.

Often when accidents occur, many people think immediately of negligence on the part of the operator. This is the situation for every kind of vehicle whether it be aircraft, boat, car, bicycle or motorcycle. The situation is similar for locomotives or trains.

It is true that there are accidents that are caused by negligence, drunkenness or a person becoming distracted while at the wheel or being preoccupied with pleasant or troublesome thoughts. But there are also accidents that occur without the operator of the vehicle being the cause.

Trains or locomotives are vehicles that greatly facilitate the transport of passengers or freight. But recently worldwide a number of calamities have occurred as a result of various mishaps arising from train accidents. Many people have lost their lives in train accidents in this country and others in Zimbabwe and India.

Recently donors from CIDA provided the TRC with equipment for crushing stone to be spread on the tracks. That action was greatly lauded by many domestic leaders. The administration of the TRC also had reason to be pleased because, as remarked by the assistant administrative general manager, citizen Emanuel Makoi, quarrying of the stones in Mkegumba Mikumi in Morogoro Region are expected to reduce the frequent occurrence of rail accidents.

Citizen Makoi said that railroad tracks without stones facilitate accidents because as the train passes by there is vibration and this causes the wheels to slip or lose their grip and causes the train to derail. But if the track has been filled with these stones, the track remains firm and is not easily vibrated and thus there will be very few accidents.

The equipment at Mkegumba is valued on the whole at approximately 26 million shillings (US\$1.5 million) and consists all together of four caterpillar [tractors], two payloaders, two air compressors, one excavator, one dumpster and another vehicle known as a "boom truck" and the actual equipment for crushing or breaking stones.

This equipment all operates automatically and has more than eight belts that convey the stones until they are finally reduced to stones measuring 3 x 7 x 8 inches by 2 or  $2\frac{1}{2}$ - $3\frac{1}{4}$ - $\frac{1}{4}$  inches depending on the crushed stone or pieces of stone required for the kind of job.

#### Quarrying

Crushing the stone and obtaining the right size begins at the excavation site of the quarry itself. This is done by exploding dynamite, which, I am informed, is a kind of very advantageously priced dynamite produced in domestic factories from petroleum, ammonium nitrate type fertilizer and a kind of powder costs less than the expensive dynamite manufactured abroad.

The next step is hauling the piles of enormous stones and conveying them to the equipment that begins sorting the stones into different batches. The job of hauling the stones is done by caterpillar payloaders. As the stones go into the next piece of equipment sorting occurs: the small stones go one place and the large stones are removed and sent back and put into another section and they are broken up some more.

During this conveyor belt process, the smallest pieces of stone are removed by other belts and dumped away from where the required pieces of stone are conveyed. All pieces are similar in size although some can differ albeit by a small amount that is not readily visible.

The stone quarries of Mkegumba Mikumi are one of the important steps for reducing accidents. The quarries can be excavated for up to 30 years and occupy an area of 150,000 square meters 7 km from the Morogo-Iringa main highway.

The quarries have 61 employees including five foreigners representing CIDA and began pilot operation in May of this year and by July they began production with a goal of producing 180,000 tons in 2 years in two stages. The first stage is up this month and it is expected that 72,000 tons will be produced based on a capacity of produce 1,500 tons per day if the equipment does not break down.

The stones from Mkegumba are expected to fulfill the requirements of Dar es Salaam and Morogoro. The job of distributing and excavating the stones has

faltered as a result of a shortage of railroad cars which is confronting the whole corporation in general.

Recently a solution began to take shape when the corporation received 30 railroad cars provided by the donors of the Mkegumba project, CIDA. The Canadian ambassador in the country, Carl Johansen, handed over to Minister of Communications and Transport John Malecela on behalf of the TRC the railroad cars valued at 13 million shillings.

#### A Modern Project

The Mkegumba project is a unique modern stone-breaking project. It is administered by the TRC. Other projects which are administered by this corporation in which stones are still broken manually include Itigi, Tura, and Moshi/Arusha which produce very few stones.

Additional major support for the TRC to increase the efficiency of obtaining sufficient stones for its railroad was provided by the European Economic Community [EEC].

The EEC has volunteered to set up other stone-breaking projects such as Mkegumba to help the corporation face the problems of numerous frequent accidents, according to a statement by Citizen Makoi who is not only the assistant manager of this corporation but also an engineer.

Despite being very pleased by the effort of the TRC/CIDA at obtaining the quarries, the employees of the quarries did have some complaints.

The quarries of Mkegumba are nearly 7 km from the main highway of Morogoro inside the open country of the Mikumi game preserve. The distance from the quarries to the market in the city of Mikumi is approximately 25 km, so the employees get a chance once a week to obtain their supplies at a special time or else they miss their transport.

One employee said "we like our work but the problem of obtaining food is very difficult." Not only are they required to purchase food for themselves but they also have to divide their wages into two parts for the sake of their families who are not permitted to be in this camp.

When he was asked if there is some method they feel will help with their problems, he said that there is something which is called "Bush Allowance," which is one of the means of compensating a person if he is in the bush and doesn't have his family and lacks other services because of living in the bush. Another also said that if they were given food at authorized prices, they would benefit a little because the price of food in the city of Mikumi is very expensive. It should be kept in mind that everyone working here is doing work requiring physical strength and needs food like gruel containing beans or meat, which they are unable to have because they go to the city once a week.

## Safety

The employees also discussed safety in connection with the stones, which, when they are excavated and broken, produce lots of dust and they have to be by the equipment with dust all around them. This situation was pointed out by the manager of the excavations, John Skipper. Since the equipment that waters the stones is damaged, leading to the stones now being broken without water, lots of dust is produced, and every employee has to suffer it since there is no one who does not have dust in his mouth since technicians and all other employees are together in the quarries.

When the experts excavating the quarries were asked if there were any problems they faced, they said that despite the fact that they were not in the city, they were very attracted by the place here if they took into consideration their fortune in living in an area where they see free roaming wild animals from their houses without any payment at all.

But these foreigners are not only attracted by the surroundings of the open country of Mikumi but also they live here without misgivings because they have all necessary services and also recreational leisure activities, and they are able to live with their families with refrigeration which makes it possible for them to have the opportunity to purchase enough supplies for a whole month without having to keep going out to buy things and they also have sufficient vehicles which makes it possible for them to come and go to Mikumi city or Mikumi Lodge for entertainment.

When he was asked about other areas which had problems involving accidents such as Gulwe and Godgode, he said that major repairs have already been made and that those areas probably will not have problems this year as they did in the past.

12721

CSO: 3449/1



## TANZANIA

### SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL DEFENDS AID PROGRAM

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 28 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by Nakan Bergstrom: "Under Secretary Gosta Edgren Says It Is a Mistake to Reduce Aid to Tanzania"]

[Text] "It is absolutely wrong to reduce aid to Tanzania just now. The Tanzanians are now showing the political will to do something about their difficult economic situation."

That was said by Gosta Edgren, under secretary of the Foreign Ministry and the official responsible for aid questions.

Edgren said that reduction of aid to Tanzania is not of current interest. International aid to Tanzania is now vital.

The government of Tanzania has been criticized for not carrying out necessary changes in economic policy.

"But Tanzania is still not the country which suffered the most in the economic crisis. World Bank figures from the middle of the 70's show that at least six African countries had still greater problems," said Gosta Edgren.

He also wanted to say that it is wrong to blame Tanzania's difficulties on its socialist system. African countries with other systems have been hit just as hard by the economic crisis.

#### Weak Economic Policies

Under Secretary Edgren believes, however, that during the past 5 years Tanzania has conducted too weak economic policies.

"For the first time during the latest budget the Tanzanian Government has taken necessary measures. If the same measures had been taken 5 years ago the economic crisis would not have been so deep," said Gosta Edgren.

The latest Tanzanian budget, which was presented on 1 June, included price increases. The former price level caused the Tanzanian state to have to subsidize industries and companies. A devaluation was carried out. Formerly the rate of exchange was such that, for example, it would be cheaper to import Swedish cement for construction of a trade school than to use Tanzania's own cement.

The budget is tight. State expenditures are limited. Agricultural policies are being changed. Changes in economic policies and devaluation are also opening the way for an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With such an agreement Tanzania will be able to get additional loans, a welcome addition to the economy.

This budget year Sweden is giving 460 million in aid to Tanzania. That is about 15 percent of all foreign aid coming to Tanzania. The aid is an important addition, in a situation where Tanzania must use 67 percent of its own export income to buy oil. The oil crisis has hit Tanzania hard.

But aid can also be a burden for the receiving country. Sweden gave 200 million kronor for the construction of the paper mill at Mufindi. An additional 100 million was invested in the operation. The World Bank is the main financial source. The operation of the paper mill has become an expensive affair for Tanzania.

"Today we would absolutely not have made such an investment in Mufindi. Together with the Tanzanians we made too optimistic a judgment of future developments. That was an incorrect judgment, which we also made in our own country. But Sweden has margins for making incorrect investments. For Tanzania it was a catastrophe to have built up a number of industries which can not be utilized because of the world economic crisis," said Gosta Edgren.

#### Prestige

Those giving the aid must receive some of the blame.

"What makes Africa's crisis more difficult is that those giving the aid have to such a large extent tied their inputs to large projects. When it later becomes necessary to readjust the economy, many donors of aid for prestige reasons will not sacrifice their projects and put them in mothballs," said Gosta Edgren.

About one-fourth of the capacity of Tanzanian industrial capacity is utilized today.

But the picture should not be painted entirely black. Foreign aid has also given results.

"Above all we have succeeded with our investments in education. Illiteracy has declined from 75 percent at independence in 1961 to 20 percent today," said Gosta Edgren.

"It is difficult to measure the value of other inputs. But in many cases we have succeeded in starting the development processes. Our investment in the expansion of the water supply in Tanzania caused many other aid suppliers and underdeveloped countries to begin to invest in water projects," he continued.

In 1971 Tanzania established the ambitious goal that all inhabitants should, 20 years later in the year 1991, have access to drinkable water within suitable walking distance, 400 meters. It is not happening. But progress is still seen in Tanzania, which has fully 20 million inhabitants. In 1975 3.5 million inhabitants had access to water within walking distance. Five years later the number had risen to 6.4 million.

#### Belief in Import Support

Gosta Edgren believes in a continued strong investment in import support to Tanzania. In the budget year 1984/85 Tanzania will get nearly 190 million kronor in import support (of a total aid of 460 million). Import support means that Tanzania will get money to buy necessary imported goods, for example spare parts for industry. This type of support is important in a situation where Tanzania lacks its own money with which to purchase imported goods.

"Import support can also be used to support agriculture, transport and health care," said Gosta Edgren.

At the end of June 1985 Sweden concludes its large investments within the health care sector (which SVENSKA DAGBLADET reported on in a previous article). Part of the import support in the future, however, can be used for the purchase of equipment and medicines for health care.

Gosta Edgren also said that administrative aid is very significant. During the budget year 1984/85 20 million kronor will be used for administrative aid to Tanzania. The funds will be used, among other things, to pay consultants and experts who will help Tanzania to strengthen the central administration.

"In the crisis which now exists in all of Africa, administration is generally weak. Those granting aid have taken over large parts of the activities in the underdeveloped countries. Instead of having a strong agricultural department, there is perhaps a number of agricultural projects which are all run by the embassies of those granting aid. To counter this development, which is apparent in many African countries, we must strengthen the central administration of the underdeveloped countries. It is needed to create a better coordination and national policy," believes Under Secretary Gosta Edgren.

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CSO: 3650/52

SWEDEN ASSISTS IN ESTABLISHING STATISTICAL BUREAU

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 28 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by Hakan Bergstrom: "Central Statistical Bureau With Swedish Help"]

[Text] Four billion to Tanzania. A SVENSKA DAGBLADET series about 20 years of aid. This is the last article in the series about aid to Tanzania. The previous articles came out on 14, 15, 19, 22 and 23 October.

Dar es Salaam--On the upper floor of the decrepit colonial palace--which was built before the first World War when the country was still called German East Africa--there is the energetic Mr Mbalilaki.

His little adding machine spits out strips of paper bearing numbers; the strips form serpents on the large work table. Once the building was a casino. Then the mathematical calculations concerned only the gambling debts of the tropically dressed imperialists.

Today the building is the seat of the Central Statistical Bureau of Tanzania.

"Unfortunately we have not been able to do all the statistical investigations that we want to do. For example, we would like to do a thorough investigation to find out how the homes in the country are equipped," said Mr Mbalilaki, who is the head of the Central Statistical Bureau.

The statistical bureau was established with Swedish help, an example of administrative aid (which Gosta Edgren touched upon in his interview). Tanzanian statisticians are sent to Sweden and other places for 4 months training, and then return as collectors of statistics in the regions. On the lower floor of the old casino, with its shutters opening onto the strand promenade in Dar es Salaam, is Carl-Olof Cederblad. He is a statistician, paid with aid money to be an advisor to the Tanzanian statistical bureau.

About 20 academicians work in the Central Statistical Bureau in Dar es Salaam. About the same number of field statisticians are located out in the regions.

Is this aid needed by the Tanzanian bureaucracy? Statistics give knowledge about conditions in the country. Politicians need this knowledge in order to make correct decisions. This is about how Carl-Olof Cederblad sees it.

He gives an example of what the Swedish-trained statisticians have accomplished. They investigated firewood consumption in the Tabora region. The forests were disappearing in that area at an unheard of rate, and the soil was being destroyed. One explanation for the shrinking availability of firewood was that people need it to heat their food and themselves. But Tabora is also a tobacco region.

The statisticians investigated: They found that each household consumed 1.7 cubic meters of firewood per person per year. But they also found that the tobacco growers used 23 cubic meters of firewood for each hectare of cultivated tobacco. They dry the tobacco leaves in large barns, bringing in hot air through pipes in the barns. Firewood is needed for this.

It is hoped that this statistical knowledge will be useful when the politicians attack the problem of deforestation.

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CSO: 3650/52



## PROBLEMS NOTED IN HIGHWAY TRANSPORT OF GOODS

Lubumbashi MJUMBE in French 10 Sep 84 p 4

/Article by Mfuamba Tambwe/

/Text/ The present economic situation in Shaba reflects the progress of the current agricultural growing season. An abundance of foodstuffs is apparent on the market. But difficulties constantly arise in transporting them to centers of consumption. This situation is generally related to the highway infrastructure and to the very high cost of transporting those foodstuffs.

In his recent address to members of the regional purchasing pool citizen Mandungu Bula Nyati, MPR president and Shaba regional governor, indicated that agricultural production is abundant in our rural areas. He pointed out, however, that farm roads are inadequate.

Deplored above all in rural circles is the impassability of most roads serving agricultural areas, including the Kilwa-Pweto and Pepa-Kansimba segments, and the poor condition of ferries at Nyemba and Pyoko. Because of the deterioration of those roads, truckers are reluctant to use them. Conditions are hard on vehicles, occasioning frequent breakdowns.

Throughout the areas served by all those neglected roads considerable quantities of foodstuffs are spoiling. Those who sacrifice themselves to travel them charge excessive prices. As those prices are not regulated, they vary periodically according to demand. Confirmation of this comes from individual sellers of farm produce in our urban centers. They particularly complain of the very high cost of transport, pointing out that it sometimes exceeds the purchase price of the produce itself.

According to them, farmers at Kongolo, for example, sell a 100 kg sack of corn for 400 zaires, or even 350. Because of barter exchanges of various goods for agricultural products, those prices range from 200 to 250 zaires. That sack of corn sells in Lubumbashi for over 750 z, for its transport alone is said to cost more than 400 z.

Certain information in our possession indicates that farmers sell their produce at prices below those officially established. They sell corn for less than 4 z per kg rather than the official price of about 6.20 z.

In that regard, growers' reactions are sometimes justified. They say demand is proving quite limited in this crop year in relation to rapidly increasing supplies. Middlemen are unable to attract significant quantities of food-stuffs from growers, owing to their lack of working capital. Banks and other lending institutions, they conclude, are not granting them the same advantages as formerly.

Faced with such uncertain conditions for disposing of their crops, farmers have decided to lower their prices, lest their produce spoil. The problem of road infrastructure is indeed generalized throughout Zaire. It is a major concern to the executive council and regional authorities.

In Haut-Zaire the regional governor recently held important talks with citizen Muengi, regional highways director. Together they made a comprehensive assessment of road conditions in agricultural areas. Difficulties involved in grading and surfacing of those roads were considered in the course of the talks. The two conferees also gave consideration to repair of certain priority road segments, taking into account resources available to the Haut-Zaire highways department.

#### Executive Council Action

Aware as it is of the importance of highway infrastructure policy to economic recovery, the executive council has not been indifferent to all these present problems. In the context of international cooperation certain agreements have been signed looking to rehabilitation of roads serving agricultural areas.

In addition to those agreements, a large scale program has just been set up. It consists of developing manual roadmending operations on national and regional highways. The program also aims at strengthening control over works executed manually by highways department contract laborers.

That department will soon assign 50 of its engineers to the interior of the country, particularly to rural areas, where they will provide comprehensive oversight of the program's execution. Activities by these engineers on the national highway net will be funded by the highway department. Their work on farm roads will be at the request of regional authorities.

Consequently, a period of retraining is in progress for those engineers at the Kasangulu training center. Only after this retraining will the 50 engineers be assigned progressively to the 50 agricultural areas. For Shaba, the areas selected are Kalemie, Moba, Kabalo, Kongolo, Nyunzu, and Manono.

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CSO: 3419/84

## BRIEFS

INFLATION REDUCTION--Kinshasa, 10 November (AFP)--Zaire has reduced inflation during the first 9 months of the year to 17.7 percent of an annual rate compared with 72 percent last year, official figures showed. By the end of the year the rate should be less than 20 percent, which would be 10 percent below the target set under an economic adjustment program agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government said. International experts and business circles described the figures as demonstrating a remarkable performance, particularly as the 1983 inflation rate was estimated unofficially at around 100 percent. The government, hoping for a growth of gross domestic product of two percent this year, noted that mining output was slow, being up only 1.9 percent, while in the first 9 months there was a fall in the price of copper, which is one of the country's main resources. [Text]  
[Paris AFP in English 1218 GMT 10 Nov 84 AB]

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14 Dec 1984